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  I
ABSTRACT 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of M.C.M. 
 
The Probability of Chinese Mortgage Loan Default and Credit Scoring 
By Weizhuo Wang 
 
Credit scoring is broadly applied in consumer lending especially in credit cards and 
mortgages. Credit scoring has not been widely used in business lending because business loan 
differ substantially across household borrowers, making it more difficult to build up an 
accurate scoring method. However, this has changed. The complexity and flexibility of 
statistical models and advanced computing technology have made such credit scoring possible 
in business lending. Thus, many banks are using credit scoring model to evaluate business 
loan applications, which is a cost effective credit management tool (Mester, 1997). 
 
Preceding credit scoring valuation is important against the increasing financial risk, and 
adopting credit risk analysis method to value the consumer credit is a necessary step to resist 
serious credit loss (Li and Zhang, 2003). It is important for banks to understand that every 
borrower is a potential lemon and the probability to default is high. This is evidenced in 
today’s U.S. subprime loan problems. In essence, a credit scoring model provides an objective 
estimate of a borrower’s credit risk. Since a lender can not observe the borrower’s probability 
to default, credit scoring models enable lending institutions to rank potential customers 
according to their default risk, and improve the allocation of loan resources. 
 
Similarly, as China becomes more consumer credit culture and people start to borrow money 
for homes and other investments, an international risk standard management framework 
becomes more important for Chinese domestic banks. The efficiency advantage of credit 
scoring models certainly will help the banks to meet the growth in Chinese consumer loans 
and mitigate default risk. 
 
The primary problem of any lender is to differentiate between "good" and "bad" debtors prior 
to granting credit. Such differentiation is possible by using a credit-scoring method. In this 
study, we examine how this inference problem impacts mortgage borrowers’ characteristics 
on the probability of loan default. This includes volume of loan granted and loan price which 
is the interest charged on loans. We use a credit scoring model to investigate the bank 
mortgage lending policy in China during the period 2004 to 2009. 
  II
 
The results show Age group, Education level, Occupation type, and Region positively impact 
the amount of credit granted. Gender, Age group, Marital status, Annual income, Bank rating, 
Occupation type, Loan duration and Region have negative impacted on loan pricing. The 
findings also suggest that it is necessary to review the borrowers’ creditworthiness 
periodically, as the changes in economic condition could affect the loan performance. The 
results are generally consistent with the existing literature. 
 
 
Keywords:  Credit scoring, Mortgage loans, Default, Logistic regression 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Credit scoring was one of the earliest financial risk management tool developed. It was used 
by the U.S. in the 1950s with early applications of portfolio analysis to manage and diversify 
the risk inherent in investment portfolios (Thomas et al., 2002). Credit scoring models are 
complex and often vary among creditors and for different types of credit. Credit scoring 
models are used as a tool for underwriting and administering all forms of retail credit, 
including credit cards, direct and indirect instalment loans, residential mortgages, home equity 
loans, and small business credit (OCC Bulletin, 1997). The models offer a cost-efficient way 
to make sound decisions based on bank or industry experience. Different types of credit 
scoring models are used for various activities. For example, credit scoring models can be used 
effectively to control risk selection, manage credit losses, evaluate new loan programs, 
improve loan approval processing time, and ensure that existing credit criteria are sound and 
consistently applied. 
 
Credit scoring is a method combining the borrower’s historical and statistical techniques to 
evaluate the credit risk of loan applications (Turvey and Brown, 1990). It is a statistical 
approach to predicting the probability that a credit applicant will default or become delinquent 
(Berger and Frame, 2007). A credit scoring system awards points for each factor that helps 
predict whether a borrower is likely to repay a loan. The total number of points--a credit 
score--helps to predict how creditworthy a borrower is, that is, how likely it is that a borrower 
will repay a loan and make the payments when due (National Consumer Law Center, 2005). 
 
Credit scoring is broadly applied in consumer lending, especially in credit cards and 
mortgages. Credit scoring has not been widely used in business lending because business loan 
differ substantially across household borrowers, making it more difficult to build up an 
accurate scoring method. However, this has changed. The complexity and flexibility of 
statistical models and advanced computing technology have made such credit scoring possible 
in business lending. Thus, many banks are using credit scoring model to evaluate business 
loan applications, which is a cost effective credit management tool (Mester, 1997). 
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Most banks in China use judgemental techniques in assessing credit risk. The judgemental 
system depends on the experience and common sense of the credit evaluator. In addition, this 
method of assessing credit involves subjectivity of the credit assessing officer. This loan 
approval process can not ensure lenders are applying the same underwriting criteria to all 
borrowers regardless of race, gender, or other factors (Mester, 1997). Judgemental assessment 
has some serious limitations, for example, the difference in loan officers’ experiences lead to 
different views regarding the relationships between risk and specific credit characteristics of 
loan applicators. Consequently, lending institutions can not ensure loan officers’ approval of 
loan applications is consistent with the risk objectives of the institution (Avery et al., 1996).  
 
As China becomes more consumer credit culture and people start to borrow money for homes 
and other investments, an international risk standard management framework becomes more 
important for Chinese domestic banks. The efficient credit scoring models certainly will help 
banks to meet the growth in Chinese consumer loans and mitigate default risk. For example, 
mortgage lending in China has been growing at a rate of 54.9% between 2000 and 2004. By 
November 2009, the total outstanding housing loans in China have reached RMB5.24 trillion 
(Anonymous, 2009). Preceding credit scoring valuation is important against the increasing 
financial risk, and adopting credit risk analysis method to value the consumer credit is a 
necessary step to resist serious credit loss (Li and Zhang, 2003). It is important for banks to 
understand that every borrower is a potential lemon and the probability to default is high. This 
is evidenced in today’s U.S. subprime loan problems. In essence, a credit scoring model 
provides an objective estimate of a borrower’s credit risk. Since a lender can not observe the 
borrower’s probability to default, credit scoring models enable lending institutions to rank 
potential customers according to their default risk, and improve the allocation of loan 
resources. 
 
For years, banks have been using credit scoring systems to determine whether a borrower is a 
good risk for credit cards and auto loans. Following this, credit scoring has been used to help 
banks evaluate a borrower’s ability to repay home mortgage loans and whether to charge 
deposits for utility services. Many auto and home insurance companies use special credit 
scores to decide whether to issue a policy and for how much (National Consumer Law Centre, 
2005). 
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1.2 Background of Chinese mortgage lending  
Real estate industry is an important pillar industry in China. China is a developing country 
with a population of 1.3 billion, and housing is a basic need for people’s livelihood as well as 
a public good. The development of the real estate industry closely relates to the overall 
economic growth. If real estate bubbles burst due to economic or political factors, housing 
prices will plummet before economic slowdown at a faster rate than overall economic growth, 
inflicting greater impacts on consumer confidence and economic growth than any other 
industry (Liu, 2007). It is important for banks to mitigate risk associated with real estate loans. 
In China, the Construction Bank of China (CBC) is the leader in mortgage lending 
(Anonymous, 2008). Table 1.1 shows CBS classifications of Chinese mortgages loans.    
 
Table 1.1 Classified Real Estate Loans in China 
Classification Purpose of the loan  
Personal housing loan  Used to support the individuals in cities and towns of mainland 
China to buy, build house and housing repair. 
Second home loan  Used to support individuals purchase secondary market trading 
houses. 
Housing provident fund loan Use of bank credit and housing accumulation fund to buy 
various types of housing but who with full civil capacity and in 
full deposit housing provident fund loans. 
Sources: Construction Bank of China  
 
The Chinese housing loan reforms started in 1980. The main orientation of China’s housing 
policy over the last twenty years has moved away from the traditional system of welfare 
allocation (fuli fenpei) to a system of monetised allocation (huobi fenpei) of housing benefits. 
This policy encourages people to buy apartments and become home owners (Burell, 2006). 
These changes in housing policy result in privatisation of public housing and the monetisation 
of housing benefits which placed new entrants on the housing market in a vulnerable position. 
 
The Chinese people rely on their own earnings and try to save enough money to purchase 
houses (Burell, 2001). In addition, the people’s salary has increased, but the prices of new 
houses rise much faster. For example, the price for urban housing in China was set between 
500 to 2,000 RMB per square meter in 1992 (Wu, 1996). However, in late 1990s most large 
cities houses had reached 3,000 RMB per square meter. In large cities such as Shanghai and 
Beijing, the housing prices are higher and rise more rapidly (Burell, 2006). Majority of the 
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urban households have their wages increased, but have not kept up with the rise in housing 
costs (see Table 1.2) (Burell, 2006). This leads to an increase demand for housing loans.  
 
Table 1.2 Average annual per capita and household earnings and their housing 
purchasing power→ in two largest Chinese cities 
 
Cities  Individual 
average annual 
earnings 
( RMB) 
Couple 
average 
annual 
household 
earnings 
( RMB) 
Time needed for a 
60,000 RMB down 
payment.30 of HH 
earnings(years) 
Time needed to 
purchase a 300,000 
RMB apt. 30% of  
HH earnings(years) 
Beijing 18,157 36,314 5.3 27.7 
Shanghai 21,957 43,914 4.7 22.7 
National 11,152 22,304 9.0 44.7 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2003,  
 
Chinese housing loan grow rapidly over the past decade. According to the statistics from the 
People’s Bank of China (2003), the balance of personal housing loans topped 1.18 trillion 
RMB ($142.51 billion in 1998), 26.64 times the figure in 1998 (Wang, 2004). At the end of 
October 2007, outstanding residential housing loans reached 4.69 trillion RMB, a growth of 
30.75%, up 1.01 trillion RMB from the beginning of the year, accounting for 28.9% of total 
new RMB loans of commercial banks during the same period. Outstanding individual housing 
loan reached 2.6 trillion RMB, 619.2 billion RMB more than the beginning of the year 2007 
(Liu, 2007). This leads to a large demand for Chinese mortgage loans.  
 
After China’s accession to the WTO foreign lenders are allowed to participate in Chinese 
banking markets. Both domestic and foreign banks recognise the opportunity in housing loans 
in China’s housing market. According to the statistics from the People’s Bank of China 
(2003), the balance of personal housing loans topped 1.18 trillion RMB ($142.51 billion), 
26.64 times the figure in 1998 (Wang, 2004).   
 
The competition between domestic and foreign banks can intensify the underlying risks in the 
housing market. For example, as banks try to capture a larger share of the housing market, 
some commercial banks lower their lending criteria, reduce loan application steps and relax 
the borrowers’ background investigation through distorted practice (Liu, 2007). In 2006, local 
officers of some commercial banks lower lending criteria, reduce examination steps and relax 
credit background investigation. For example, the Chinese housing loans in 16 cities showed 
on average 22.31% of the borrowers did not meet the loan officer directly when getting loans, 
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including in Beijing, Hangzhou and Guangzhou (Liu, 2007). At the end of August 2007, the 
outstanding refinance mortgages and additional loans in major cities reached 41 billion RMB, 
3.5 times of that in the same period of 2006. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen credit 
information management in the real estate sector to fully leverage the credit information 
system that includes both enterprises and individuals (Liu, 2007). 
 
Compare to foreign banks, the credit assessment and management tool of Chinese banks are 
outdated. Most Chinese banks currently depend on the experience and common sense of 
credit evaluators in assessing credit risk. These evaluators can not ensure lenders are applying 
the same underwriting criteria to all borrowers (Mester, 1997). For example, the evaluators in 
Chinese banks overemphasise collateral and largely ignore the borrowers’ ability to repay the 
loans. Thus, these will lead to underestimating the risks confronting most Chinese banks 
(Rodman, 2006). According to the experience from the Western countries, the market would 
develop from cash transaction to credit transaction. Chinese banks still lag behind the Western 
modern management credit system. In China, cash transactions still play a big role in the 
market (Li and Zhang, 2003). 
 
Therefore, understanding the mortgage loan default factors in Chinese mortgage loans are 
urged to help improving the loan default rate. The rationality of banks lending decisions 
includes reducing lending costs and increasing repayment rate and operating profits to the 
banks. As a consequence, a well-developed mortgage market would promote mitigate credit 
default risks. A well developed credit scoring system would provide the reasonable 
information to decision maker and identify the consumer credit risk in time is necessary (Li 
and Zhang, 2003). 
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Table 1.3 Sources & Uses of Credit Funds of Financial Institutions (by Sectors) 
 
 
Unit: RMB100 Million Yuan 
Total  Loans 2007 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
Loans to Resident 
Sector 40229.32  41097.77 42176.26 43412.63 44307.08 45596.42  46698.89 47981.52 49423.75 50105.83 50636.52 50652.26  
   Consumption Loans 24721.77  25152.50 25672.60 26260.76 26857.74 27842.87  28695.64 29711.69 30915.96 31624.79 32333.66 32729.00  
Short-term 
Consumption Loans 2060.41  2118.10 2214.37 2330.11 2490.61 2669.92  2727.87 2833.70 2953.96 3038.09 3062.39 3104.11  
     Medium & 
Long-term 
Consumption Loans 
22661.36  23034.40 23458.23 23930.65 24367.13 25172.95  25967.77 26877.99 27962.00 28586.70 29271.27 29624.89  
                          
Total  Loans2008                     
            Loans to 
Resident Sector 51948.65  52057.46 52990.01 53718.38 54411.26 55198.94  55688.50 56192.54 56806.57 56846.35 56492.42 57057.92  
   Consumption Loans 33590.86  33587.80 33962.14 34268.33 34723.89 35309.33  35670.48 35996.43 36410.29 36535.82 36681.27 37210.29  
    Short-term 
Consumption Loans 3199.08  3117.76 3192.90 3255.64 3326.97 3465.55  3522.16 3612.36 3771.47 3864.52 3964.79 4136.86  
    Medium & 
Long-term 
Consumption Loans 
30391.78  30470.04 30769.24 31012.69 31396.92 31843.78  32148.32 32384.07 32638.82 32671.30 32716.48 33073.43  
                          
Total  Loans 2009                      
             Loans to 
Resident Sector 58415.34  58855.71 61423.56                  
   Consumption Loans 37935.36  38001.52 39392.92                  
    Short-term 
Consumption Loans 3996.58  3945.49 4366.85                  
    Medium & 
Long-term 
Consumption Loans 
33938.78  34056.02 35026.07 
                  
Source: People’s Bank of China 
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1.3 Research Problem Statement 
Understanding the mortgage loan default factors in Chinese mortgage loans help to improve 
the development of credit accessibility to households including mitigating default risk. The 
rationality of banks lending decisions includes reducing lending costs and increasing 
repayment rate and operating profits to banks. As a consequence, a well-developed mortgage 
market would promote economic growth. 
 
When people cannot commit to pay back their loans and there is limited information about 
their characteristics, lending institutions must draw inferences about their likelihood of default. 
The primary problem of any lender is to differentiate between "good" and "bad" debtors prior 
to granting credit. Such differentiation is possible by using a credit-scoring method. In this 
study, we examine how this inference problem impacts mortgage borrowers’ characteristics 
on the probability of loan default. This includes the volume of loan granted and the loan price 
which is the interest charged on loans. We use a credit scoring model to investigate the 
probability of Chinese mortgage loan default during the period 2004 to 2009.  
 
The specific research objectives include: 
• To identify the factors in mortgage lending  performance of Chinese banks 
• To investigate the factors affecting the volume of credit granted by Chinese banks 
• To investigate the factors affecting the mortgage interest rate charged by Chinese banks 
1.4 Significance of study  
This research is expected to contribute to the development of Chinese mortgage market in 
additional to analysing the rational behaviour of mortgage loan default processes. 
Understanding the mortgage loan default factors in Chinese mortgage loans help to improve 
the development of credit accessibility to households including mitigating default risk. The 
rationality of banks lending decisions includes reducing lending costs and increasing 
repayment rate and operating profits to banks. As a consequence, a well-developed mortgage 
market would promote economic growth. 
 
In addition, this research would benefit both lender and borrowers. Instead of using subjective 
evaluation decision-rules, which are bias and unreliable, lenders can apply an objective 
evaluation technique with a standard process and criteria to appraise their customer’s credit 
risks and creditworthiness. A good credit risk management tool can effectively to control risk 
selection, manage credit losses, evaluate new loan programs, improve loan approval 
processing time, and ensure that existing credit criteria are sound and consistently applied. 
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Borrowers can predict whether they qualify for new loans or an extension of existing loans. 
They will be able to estimate the credit availability and the price of credit corresponding to 
their risk level. The information can enhance the borrowers’ decision-making process when 
they acquire loans. Self-assessment by borrowers also benefits the credit suppliers as it can 
monitor the default risk and reduces administrative costs. 
 
Our study uses the credit scoring model to examine the borrower’s characteristics and banks 
loan granting decision and the borrower’s default risk in China. The credit scoring model is 
applied to new loan applications and helps to determine after the loan is granted whether the 
borrower will default, and which borrower’s characteristic affect the loan price. 
 
1.5 Outline of thesis  
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the relevant 
literature and the theatrical background on credit scoring, credit availability model and loan 
pricing model. Chapter 3 describes the empirical models, the estimation techniques, the data, 
and the data collection method. Chapter 4 presents the results and discussion of the results 
generated by the analysis. Chapter 5 summarises the major findings followed by the limitation 
of the research and recommendations for the future study. 
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter reviews the relevant on mortgage loan default model (credit scoring model), 
demand for credit, and cost of credit. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 
discusses the probability of mortgage loan default and credit evaluation techniques. Section 
2.2 discusses the concepts of credit scoring and explains how credit scoring works. Section 
2.3 discusses the benefits and limitations of credit scoring models. The variables and 
modelling techniques used in credit scoring models are summarised in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. 
Section 2.6 identifies the demand for credit and credit availability model, and Section 2.7 
discusses the interest rate and loan pricing model. 
 
2.1 Mortage loan default analysis: judgemental versus credit scoring 
The probability of mortgage loan default depends upon the borrower credit risk that is the 
probability of the borrower not repaying the loan. Credit analysis includes the valuation of the 
financial history and financial statements of the applicant credit background. It is the primary 
method used in appraising credit risks. The objectives of credit analysis are to determine the 
financial strength of the borrower, to estimate the borrower’s probability of repayment, and to 
reduce the risk of non-payment to an acceptable level. There are two major problems in credit 
analysis: the assessment of all important factors about an applicant simultaneously and the 
evaluation of all applicants objectively (Sinkey, 2002; Plata and Nartea, 1998). The factors 
used to assess loan applicators include monthly income, outstanding debt, financial assets, 
whether the applicant has defaulted or is over delinquent on a previous loan (Schreiner, 2000), 
and the loan applicant’s subjective factors, such as age, gender, education, marital status, 
income, and other personal characteristics that will affect the applicant’s loan performance 
(Boyes et al., 1989). The objectives of loan assessment are to predict the probability of loan 
default and mitigate the default risk (Jacobson and Roszbach, 2003).  
 
There are two main techniques used to evaluate a borrower’s creditworthiness (Crook, 1996): 
the loan officer subjective assessment (judgemental technique) and the credit scoring 
technique. 
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Creditworthiness is judged based on the characteristics of an individual that makes him or her 
qualify for a loan; and one who is not creditworthy will be unqualified for the loan (Lewis, 
1992). The subjective assessment of a borrower’s creditworthiness is based on 6 C’s- 
Character, Capacity, Cash, Collateral, Conditions and Control (Rose, 1993) (see Table 2.1). 
 
Glassman and Wilkins (1997), Crook (1996), and Lewis (1992) argue judgmental assessment 
of credit is inefficient, unexplainable, inconsistent and non-uniform. Traditional methods of 
deciding loan granting base on experience of previous decisions and use human judgement of 
the risk default. However, economic pressures resulting from increased demand for credit, 
allied with greater commercial competition and the emergence of new computer technology; 
have led to the sophistically models to aid the credit granting decision (Hand and Henley, 
1997).  Credit scoring methods produce more accurate classifications than subjective 
judgemental assessments by human experts. Rosenberg and Gleit (1994) and Chandler and 
Coffman (1979) discuss the credit scoring method advantages over the judgemental 
assessment. For example, credit scoring can increase efficiency by leaving loan officer to 
concentrate only on ambiguous cases, and it also allowed the lenders to review the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers periodically (Glassman and Wilkins, 1997). Thus, credit 
scoring models have become a preferable technique in credit risk appraisal. 
 
Altman (1968) was the first to use a statistical model to predict probability of a borrower’s to 
default aimed at identifying the borrower credit risk more objectively. Following this, many 
statistical credit scoring models have been developed, such as logistic regression, neural 
networks, smoothing nonparametric and expert systems and have been widely used in 
assessing credit risk (Hand and Hanley, 1997).  
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Table2.1 The Six basic C’s in lending  
Character Capacity Cash Collateral Conditions Control 
• Customer past 
payment 
record 
• Experience of 
other lender 
with current 
customer 
• Purpose of 
loan Customer 
track record in 
forecasting  
• Credit rating  
• Presence 
• Identify of 
customer and 
guarantors 
• Copies of charters 
resolutions, 
agreements, and 
other documents 
bearing on the 
legal standing of 
the borrowing 
customer. 
• Description of 
history, legal 
structure, owners, 
natural of 
operations, 
productions, and 
principal 
customers and 
suppliers for a 
business borrower
 
• Past earnings, dividends, 
and sales record. 
• Adequacy of projected 
cash flow. 
• Availability of liquid 
reserves. 
• Turnover of payables, 
receivables, and 
inventory. 
• Capital structure and 
leverage. 
• Expense controls.  
• Coverage ratios.  
• Recent performance of 
borrower stock and P/E 
ratio.  
• Management quality. 
• Content of auditor report 
and statement footnotes. 
• Recent accounting 
changes. 
• Ownership of assets 
• Age of assets 
• Vulnerability to 
obsolescence 
• Liquidation value 
• Degree of 
specialization in 
assets. 
• Liens, encumbrances 
and restrictions. 
• Leases and mortgages 
issued 
• Insurance covered  
• Guarantees and 
warranties issued 
• Bank relative position 
as creditor 
• Lawsuits and tax 
situation 
• Probable future 
financing needs 
• Customer position in 
industry and expected 
market share  
• Customer performance 
vis-à-vis comparable 
firms in industry 
• Competitive climate for 
customer product  
• Sensitivity of customer 
and industry to business 
cycles and changes in 
technology 
• Labour market 
conditions 
• Impact of inflation on 
customer balance sheet 
and cash floe 
• Long-run industry 
outlook 
• Regulation; political and 
environmental factors 
 
• Applicable banking 
laws and regulations 
regarding the character 
and quality of 
acceptable loans 
• Adequate 
documentation for 
examiners 
• Signed 
acknowledgements and 
correctly prepared loan 
documents 
• Consistency of loan 
request with bank 
written loan policy  
• Inputs from non-credit 
personnel ( such as 
economists or political  
experts) on external 
factors affecting factors 
affecting loan 
repayments  
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2.2 What is credit scoring? 
Credit scoring is used by U.S. retailers and mail-order firms in the 1950s with the early 
application of investment portfolios to manage and diversify borrowers default risks (Thomas 
et al., 2002). Nowadays the credit scoring models are becoming one of the most successful 
techniques of modelling in finance and banking (Abdou et al., 2007). Credit score is based on 
statistical analysis of the borrowers’ credit files, using borrowers’ historical data and 
statistical techniques; it tries to isolate the effect of various characteristics of applicators on 
delinquencies and defaults (Frame et al., 2001; Mester, 1997; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997; 
Turvey and Brown, 1990). 
 
 The techniques and practices of statistical credit scoring came to be applied by lenders, 
unevenly and in a relatively unplanned manner, to the problem of reducing losses due to the 
non-repayment of credit loans (Marron, 2007). Credit scoring models can assist banks to 
make lending decisions. Credit scoring can supplement or even replace the traditional 
subjective assessment of pertinent information in applicant’s report, the statistically derived 
measure of the credit risk associated with a given credit history allow lenders to better and 
more quickly assess the strengths and weaknesses of applications (Avery et al., 1996). 
 
Credit scoring is broadly used in consumer lending, especially in credit cards, and has became 
more commonly used in mortgage lending. The advanced computer technology increased data 
accessibility for business loans and this have made such scoring applicable in complex 
business loans. Thus, more and more banks are using credit scoring to evaluate loan 
applications, as credit scoring tends to standardise loans and make applicators’ default risk 
more predictable (Mester, 1997). As banking markets in developing countries are maturing, 
banks need to face competitions from both domestic and foreign banks. The credit scoring 
models could give banks the substantial growth of retail credit and increased regulatory 
attention to risk management (Dihn and Kleimeier, 2007). 
 
Credit scoring system is a computerised procedure generating a number of points (a score) 
according to a number of the borrowers’ relevant characteristics, such as income, profession, 
age, wealth, previous loans, etc. The total score is obtained by summing the individual 
borrower’s score. If the score is higher than a lender’s “cut-off-level”, credit will be granted, 
otherwise the credit will be refused (Steenackers and Goovaerts, 1989). The overall idea of 
credit scoring model is quite straightforward. Based on the statistical probabilities, the 
combinations of borrowers’ characteristics differentiating “good” from “bad” generate a score 
(or probability) serve as an estimate of the risk level of each new loan when then lenders 
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decide whether to make the loans or not (Crook, 1996). Crook (1996) argues that the aim of 
credit scoring is to predict risk, not to explain it. Thus, it is not necessary that the predictive 
model also explains why some borrowers default on the loan repayment and others do not. 
 
Borrowers’ credit history and other characteristics regarding repayment ability that are 
generally provided by borrower are electronically analysed.  Credit models would predict the 
default risk of any loan granted based on previous experience with borrowers of similar loan 
profiles. A well-designed model should give high scores to borrowers whose loans would 
perform well and low scores to borrowers whose loans would not perform well. To develop a 
good credit scoring model, it is necessary to review the borrowers’ credit worthiness 
periodically, as changes in economic condition could affect loan performances. In general, 
there is no best credit scoring models. It is possible some bad borrowers may get a high score 
and receive the loans, and vice versa (McAllister and Mingo, 1994). Jensen (1992) find that 
using credit scoring, approximately 8 percent of the applications would be approved when 
they were actually bad loans and 18 percent of the applications would be rejected when they 
were good loans. This is similar to the Type I and II errors in the hypotheses development. 
 
In any credit market, borrowers have the option to default; defaulters are not exogenously 
excluded from future borrowing; there is free entry of lenders and borrowers; and lenders 
cannot collude to punish defaulters. Limited credit or credit at higher interest rates following 
default arises from the lender’s response to limited information about the borrower’s 
behaviour and earnings realisations. The lender learns from an individual’s borrowing and 
repayment behaviour about his/her type and encapsulates his/her reputation for not defaulting 
in a credit score (Chatterjee, Corbae and Ríos-Rull, 2008). 
 
2.3 Benefits and limitations of credit scoring  
Credit scoring techniques have a number of benefits compared to judgemental techniques for 
both lenders and borrowers. The attributes in credit scoring that have led to its increasing use 
in loan evaluation include (Mester, 1997; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997; Crook, 1996; 
McAllister and Mingo, 1994; Lewis, 1992; Chandler and Coffman, 1979): 
 
1. Increased efficiencies and reduced costs 
Credit scoring models allow immediate handling of the definite binary (Yes/No) 
decisions; this leaves more time for credit officers to focus on loans that least well-
handled by the models. Credit scoring is also an efficient way to grant loan, the loan 
granting time is reduced to days or hours instead of weeks for consumers. Credit 
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officer can handle more loan applications than in traditional loan assessment 
framework. 
 
2. Reduced potential for bias 
Credit scoring is a standard loan granting process. Lenders apply the criteria built into 
the model and applicants are measured against these criteria. The model considers the 
characteristics of both good and bad borrowers, but the judgemental methods are 
usually negatively biased towards bad borrowers.  The model helps lenders ensure 
that the same underwriting criteria have been applied to all borrowers regardless of 
race, gender or other factors prohibited by commercial law used in credit appraisal. 
 
3. Ability to control risk levels 
Lenders use credit scoring to differentiate risk categories of loans. Instead of lender 
rejecting the high risk loans category, the credit analyst can estimate credit risk of the 
borrowers with reasonable degree of confidence and the cut-off score can be adjusted 
according the risk of the loan portfolio. 
 
4. Lending system 
Credit scoring models are base on the borrowers’ previous history. The credit scoring 
system can re-estimate the model continuously base on the large amount of data. For 
lenders, the next applicant’s behaviour can be better predicted base on the database 
and previous credit history recorded in the system. With the recent development of 
neural networks- “self-learning” computer programs, the level of the credit scoring 
process can develop in terms of complexity and accuracy is unknown. These models 
will be improved given time. 
 
5. Risk monitoring 
In cases which the bank uses a credit-scoring model, lenders are required to review 
the creditworthiness of the borrowers periodically. This credit review process is used 
to monitor the individual borrower’s risk profile and to adjust aggregate loan loss 
reserves. 
 
Although credit scoring can reduce costs and increase consistency to the loan 
granting process, the weakness of credit scoring should not be ignored. The 
limitations of credit scoring models include (Banasik, Crook, and Thomas, 2003; 
Crook, 1996; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997; Mester, 1997): 
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i. Data and accuracy of the model 
Accuracy is an important consideration in using credit scoring. If the models are not 
accurate, these cost savings and other benefits of credit scoring could be negatively 
affected by poorly performing loans. Credit scoring models are complex; the models 
are only good if the data could feed them. Poor and inaccurate credit report 
information will invalidate results. The data used in credit scoring should include a 
sample of both well-performing and bad performing loans. The data also required to 
update regularly, as the model should be re-estimated frequently to ensure that 
changes in the relationship between potential factors and loan performance are 
captured. 
 
ii. Knowing the customer 
Borrowers’ characteristics related to their likelihood of repayment and defaults. 
Although credit models attempt to predict a borrower’s actual behaviour, there is no 
substitute for knowing the borrower. Most credit scoring models are embedded with 
human errors. Credit scoring will not replace the judgments of loan officers or loan 
groups based on informal qualitative knowledge. It is important in dealing with 
customer who has not had a pristine credit history or where the ability to repay the 
loan may be the primary factor on which a credit decision is based. In such cases, a 
working manual will be required to combine with credit scoring to make the lending 
decisions. 
 
iii. Economic condition 
An accurate model needs to make predictions in both expansions and recessions. 
Thus, the data used in the model should cover both good and bad economic periods. 
If the data on which the model is used does not include repayment behaviour in an 
economic downturn, lenders may face higher default risk than they have planned. 
 
iv. Selection bias 
Credit scoring models are used to predict the probability of default but the models are 
usually parameterised using a sample of accepted applicants only. This selection bias 
could lead to bias estimation by credit scoring model.   
 
To avoid the bias in credit scoring model, Schreiner (2003) argues that banks should apply 
their credit scoring model to loans that are already conditionally approved by the credit 
officers. According to the First National Bank of Chicago, for small- business loans, about 
25% of the applications rejected by the model were later approved by the credit officers. Thus, 
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to fully extend the advantage of credit scoring and avoid bias, the bank’s credit assessment 
can be a combination of the traditional lending via credit scoring models (Dinh and Kleimeier, 
2007). 
 
2.4 Variables commonly used in credit scoring models 
The pragmatism and empiricism of credit scoring implies that any characteristics and 
environments of the borrower that has obvious connections with default risk should be used in 
the scoring system (Lewis, 1992). The variables should be sequentially added or deleted to 
maximise the model’s predictive accuracy (Henley and Hand, 1997). There are two important 
standards for variable selection; first, the variables should have significant coefficients and 
contribute to explanation of the dependent variable’s variance. Second, the variables should 
have close correlation with included variables (Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007). Lewis (1992) 
suggests that there is no need to justify the case for any variable. If it helps the predictions, it 
should be used. 
 
However, the major factors commonly used in credit scoring models include the borrowers’ 
income, age, gender, education, occupation, employer type, region, time at present address, 
residential status, marital status, home phone, collateral value, loan duration, time with bank, 
number of loans, and current account (Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007; Roszbach, 2004; Jacobson 
and Roszbach, 2003; Martinelli, 1997; Crook, Hamilton, and Thomas, 1992; Boyes, Hoffman, 
and Low, 1989; Capon, 1982; ) 
 
Income is a commonly used proxy of the borrower’s financial wealthy and his/her ability to 
repay (Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007). There is a positive relationship between income and the 
borrowers’ default rate; higher income is associated with lower default risk (Jacobson and 
Roszbach, 2003). Occupation is a common variable used in credit scoring model and is highly 
correlated with the borrowers’ income level. 
 
Education enhances the borrowers’ ability to repay. The better educated borrowers are 
deemed to have more stable and higher income employment and thus a lower default rate. 
The borrowers’ education level distinguished from post-graduate to non-high school graduate 
(Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007). 
 
Employer refers to the type of company for which a borrower works such as stated-owned, 
foreign, joint-stock company, etc. The type of company a borrower works in could be a proxy 
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for income level and stability. Missing values of this variable are also very informative as 
borrowers who do not answer this question show the highest probability of default. 
 
Time with employer measures the number of years that the borrower has been working for the 
current employer. It reflects the satisfaction of the borrower with the current job. The higher 
the borrowers’ job satisfactions, the more stable their employment will be and the higher their 
ability to repay their loans (Cook et al., 1992). The length of time with employer may 
discriminate against women, since women’s length of employment reduces due to pregnancy 
and childbearing (Capon, 1982). 
 
Age measures the borrower’s age in years. Thomas (2000) and Boyle et al. (1992) confirm 
that older borrowers are more risk adverse, and therefore the less likely to default. Thus banks 
are more hesitant to lend to younger borrowers who are more risk averse. 
 
Gender is a fair discriminatory - base on the statistical default rates of men versus women. 
There are ample evidences that women default less frequently on loans because women are 
more risk adverse (Coval et al., 2000).  
 
Region means the area of the country that borrower lives. As people of similar wealth tend to 
live in the same location, the geographic criterion can indicate a borrower’s level of financial 
wealth. Some suburb might attract richer residents and this could result increase in housing 
and property prices. This also affects the collateral value and probability of default.   
 
The residential variable measures whether borrowers own their home, rent, or live with their 
parents. This could indicate the borrowers’ financial wealth in the case of home ownership. 
Residential status also indicates financial pressure on borrowers’ income, for example rental 
cost. Crook et al. (1992) find that borrowers living with their parents are less likely to default. 
 
Time addresses the number of years that the borrowers have been living at their current 
address. According to Crook et al.’s (1992) study, the default risk drops with an increase in 
time at present address; it might be a proxy for the borrowers’ maturity, stability, or risky 
aversion. Changing address might be a signal that a borrower’s financial wealth is high or 
improving rapidly. 
 
Marital status affects the borrower’s level of responsibility, reliability, or maturity. The 
probability of default is higher for married than single borrowers. Dinh and Kleimeier (2007) 
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discover that the marital status is typically related to number of dependants which in turn 
reflects financial pressure on the borrower and borrower’s ability to repay a loan. 
 
Collateral is a form of guarantee to support the loan. Borrowers’ collateral can be a single of 
default risk, such as, if the loans that the house serves as collateral, the probability of default 
is very low. This is because the borrowers are risk adverse and fear of losing their house. 
Collateral reduces the bank’s risk when it makes a loan (Gup and Kolari, 2005). The higher 
the collateral value the higher the incentive for the borrowers to repay the loan since they do 
not want to loose their collateral. The collateral value could also be a proxy for the borrowers’ 
financial wealth since it is significantly positive correlated with the borrowers’ income (Dinh 
and Kleimeier, 2007).   
 
Loan duration indicates the maturity of loans in months. Loan duration reflects the borrowers’ 
intention, risk aversion, or self-assessment of repayment ability. 
 
Time with the bank indicates the borrowers’ length banking relationship in years. It can be 
assumed that the longer a borrower stays with the bank, the more the bank knows about this 
borrower, and it could lower the probability of default. But this variable should be updated 
regularly due to adverse and unexpected changes in the borrowers’ situation. 
 
Number of loans measures the total number of loans a borrower has received from the bank 
during the whole relationship with the bank. Today, most borrowers have more than one loan 
from the same bank. This variable reflects the difficulty for a defaulted borrower to receive 
further loans from the same bank. 
 
Current account indicates whether the borrower holds a current account with the bank. It 
partly represents the borrowers’ financial wealth, and relationship between the borrower and 
the bank. The borrowers who hold current accounts with their banks have a lower default risk. 
 
However, Boyes et al. (1989) recognised that if banks were minimising default risk, one 
should find the above variables with positive (negative) effect on the probability of granting a 
loan and a negative (positive) effect on default risk.  
 
2.5 Credit scoring and modelling techniques 
There are several statistical methods used to estimate credit scoring models in assessing 
borrowers’ credits, such as discriminate analysis (Dunn and Frey, 1976), linear probability 
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models (Turvey, 1991), probit models (Lufbuttow et al., 1984) and logit models (Mortensen 
et al., 1988). The last three methods estimate the default rate based on the historical data on 
loan performances and the borrowers’ characteristics. The idea of linear probability is to look 
up for a linear combination of explanatory variables. It assumes there is a linear relationship 
between the default rate and the factors. The probit model assumes the probability of default 
follows the standard cumulative normal distribution function. The probability of default is 
logistically distributed in the logit model and discriminant analysis divides borrowers into 
high and low default-risk classes (Mester, 1997). 
 
Discriminant analysis presents the critical assessment of the use of discriminant analysis in 
business. However, Hand et al. (1996b) show that the discriminant function obtained by 
segmenting a multivariate normal distribution into two classes’ optimal discriminant function. 
Problems also arise in testing for the significance of individual variables when the assumption 
of normality does not hold and therefore we can not perform statistical inferences (Rosenberg 
and Gleit, 1994). 
 
The linear probability model could present reasonable prediction results compared to 
discriminant analysis and logit models (Collins and Green, 1982). However, Pyndick and 
Rubinfeld (1998), Greene (1997), and Judge et al. (1985) indicate that the linear probability 
model could predict the default rate, but the predictive value might not necessary lie between 
zero and one. Moreover, because the variance of the models are generally heteroscedasticity, 
it leads to inconsistent estimation problem and invalid conventional measure of fit such as 
the 2R . 
 
According to Hand and Henley (1997), the logistic approach is a more appropriate statistical 
tool than linear regression, when there are two discrete classes (good and bad risks) defined in 
the model. This gives the logistic approach superior classification rate. The probit model is 
very similar to the logit model. The logit model is generally preferred to the probit model 
because of its simplicity (Barney et al., 1999; Novak and LaDue, 1999; Lee and Jung, 1999) 
(see Table 1.3) 
 
The logistic modelling approach is commonly used to model the bank’s lending decision 
(Clarke, 2005). According to Collins and Green (1982), the logit model can increase the 
overall classification rate, and substantially reduce the error rate. The logistic approach also 
gives superior classification compare to dicriminant analysis (Wiginto, 1980). According to 
the literature, there is no best method for estimating credit scoring models and new methods 
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continue to evolve. However, the logit models and neural networks have been applied 
frequently in previous research. 
 
Table 1.3 Credit Scoring Techniques 
                                                DA       LPM.       Logit      Probit          RPA.         ANN. 
Dunn and Frey (1976)                 ? 
Lufburrow et al. (1984)                                                             ? 
Mortensen et al. (1988)                                              ? 
Miller and LaDue (1989)                                           ? 
Turvey and Brown (1990)                                          ? 
Jensen (1992)                                                                                                                   ? 
Altman et al. (1994)                    ?                                                                                  ? 
Novak and LaDue (1999)                                           ?                                ? 
Barney et al. (1999)                                      ?           ?                                                   ? 
Wu and Wang (2000)                  ?                                                                                  ? 
Jacobson and Roszbach (2003)                                                  ? 
Note: DA. = Discriminant Analysis, LPM. = Linear Probability Model, Logit. = Logistic 
Model, Probit. = Probit Model, RPA. = Recursive Partitionning Algorithms, ANN. = 
Artificial Neural Networks. 
 
Clarke (2005), Buist et al. (1999), and Horne (1997) show the logistic model fitted well in 
their estimate of loan default risk in the mortgage industry. The logit model involves two 
choices represented by a binary, zero to one, dependent variable iY . The discussion begins 
with the limited case where loans are either defaulted or not (Pinder, 1996). Collins and Green 
(1982) find the logit model could increase the overall classification rate, and substantially 
reduce the error rate.  
2.6 Credit availability model  
Demand for credit is a derived demand. Households desire credit in order to make certain 
production and consumption expenditure as well as investments (Feder et al., 1993). The 
costs and returns of credit must be considered to determine the optimal level of credit 
utilization. 
 
Bard et al. (2000) argue that there are several financial factors that may affect lender’s 
decision on the amount of loan lend, such as, financial market structure and borrower, loan 
and lender characteristics. The borrower’s characteristics indicates the credit risk, thus, it 
affect the loan amount. Bank attributes, such as lending policy, lending limits, reserve 
requirements, and available of funds are supply-side factors that could affect the availability 
of credit. Therefore, the credit availability model could be presented as follow: 
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)( ii BfA =                                                        (2.1) 
where                  jA  is the loan amount for loan ; 
                           iB  is the vector of borrower characteristics believed to influence the                 
                              loan amount. 
2.7 Interest rate and loan pricing model  
Banks’ interest rate affects the potential borrowers’ lending decision and the actions of 
borrowers. The interest rate charged by the bank could determine not only by the demand for 
capital but also the riskiness of the borrowers. The higher interest rate either presents riskier 
applicants or influences borrowers to choose other lenders. Lenders may optimally choose to 
ration the quantity of loans they have granted rather than raise the rate to clear the market 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
 
In general, the interest rate charged on loan is comprised of four components (Ruthenberg and 
Landskroner, 2008): 
 
Firstly, the financial funding cost. 
Secondly, a premium reflecting market power exercised by the bank (example Inflation). 
Thirdly, the sensitivity of the cost of capital raised to changes in loans extended. 
Fourthly, a risk premium to compensate for the risk of default by borrower. 
 
The default risk premiums explain the interest rates differences across the identical loan. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argues that the rate is charged to the borrower determines not only 
on the demand and capital but also the riskiness of the borrowers. A higher interest rate draws 
riskier applicants, and an increase in the interest rate increases the average riskiness of 
borrowers. Consequently, the differences in the interest rates are indicted the financial risk of 
the borrowers. 
 
Lenders need to set the loan rate at the reasonable level consistent with the competition in the 
financial marketplace. Lenders want to charge a high enough rate to ensure that each loan will 
be profitable and compensate for the risks the lenders are exposed to. However, the rate of the 
loan should be low enough, in such a way that the borrowers can not be driven away to 
another lender. Therefore, in the loan market lenders are price takers, not price setters (Rose, 
1993). 
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However, the competition between lenders might not be strong enough to eliminate the 
differences in interest rates across the lenders. It is more likely that lenders (for example, 
governmental banks and commercial banks) do not normally compete with each other for the 
same type of loans. Different lenders appear to have different lending practices and different 
cost structures; this can be another important factor explaining the difference in the interest 
rates charged (Limsombunchai et al., 2005). 
 
Loans in general have the contract term extended over several years, and the expectation of 
future financial market conditions play an important role in shaping the demand and supply of 
loan funds. Interest rate can be viewed as the loan price from the interaction of the demand 
and supply for loanable funds. When the individual loan is considered at a point in time, the 
factors related to the expectations of the future economy and the future financial market 
conditions are expected to be homogenous across the competing lenders and borrowers. 
Therefore, the differences of the loan prices would be determined by the characteristics of the 
borrowers, the characteristics of the individual loans, and the likelihood that the loan will be 
repaid or defaulted. 
 
In pricing a loan, the interest rate charged by a lender must cover the cost of loanable funds, 
the operating cost of the bank (such as, administration and service costs), the default risk 
premium and the profit for the lender (Lee et al., 1988). A loan pricing model can be 
expressed as follow (Rose, 1993): 
 
                         Marginal                                            Estimated 
Loan               cost of rising             Nonfunds           margin to              Bank’s  
interest =         loanable          +         bank         +     protect the      +     desired  
rate                  funds to lend            operating           bank against           profit  
                        to the borrower          costs                default risk            margin  
   
The loan pricing model can be formally expressed in general from as follows (Bard et al., 
2000): 
 
                        )( ii BfR =                                                   (2.2) 
Where  iR  is the interest rate for loan i; 
iB  is a vector of borrower and loan characteristics that may influence                                 
credit risk 
 
  - 23 - 
                                                                                                                                
Chapter 3 
 
RESEARCH METHDOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology and data. The research questions are 
presented in Section 3.1. The sample data and segmentation of variables are presented in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.2.1. The research models are described in Section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 
3.4.1 discuss the estimation techniques and the model sensitivity analysis. Section 3.5 
concludes the chapter. 
 
3.1 Research question 
The objective of this research is to examine the effects of the borrower’s characteristics in 
mortgage loan default, volume of loan granted and loan price. The credit scoring model is 
applied to investigate the probability of mortgage default in China during the period 2004 to 
2009. 
 
The whole sample mortgage loan are divided into different categories, such as borrowers’ 
characteristics (age, gender, annual income, education level, occupation type, marital status, 
and region), loan amount, loan duration (shorter or longer than 5 years), relationship with the 
bank (“good” if the borrower does not delay loan repayment or “ok” if the borrower delays 
loan repayment), loan status (default loan or non-default loan), and loan price (the interest 
range charged by banks, less than or equal to 3 years, 3 years to 5 years, and greater than or 
equal to 5 years lending period). 
 
Research Question One examines the Chinese mortgage loan default. According to Barney et 
al. (1999) and Wu and Wang (2000) studies, there are several statistical methods used to 
estimate credit scoring models. These include discriminant analysis, linear probability models, 
logit models, and probit models. The last three methods are standard statistical techniques for 
estimating the probability of loan default base on the borrowers’ characteristics and historical 
data of loan performance.  
 
The logistic approach is the most widely employed statistical procedure used to model the 
bank’s lending decision (Clarke, 2005). Collins and Green’s (1982) study find that the logit 
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model can increase the overall classification rate, and substantially reduce the error rate. 
According to Mester (1997), Turvey (1991), Mortensen et al. (1988), Lufburrow et al. (1984), 
and Dunn and Frey’s (1976) studies, logit model provides asymptotically consistent, efficient 
and unbiased estimates. Thus, logit model is used in this study to estimate bank lending 
decision via the maximum likelihood estimation technique.  
 
The logit model assumes the borrowers’ probability of default is logistically distributed. The 
model examines the parameters as dummy variables with multiple categories. The dummy 
regression model converts the variables of quantitative terms to numerical value of 0 and 1. In 
the bank lending decision model, the dependent and independent variables are dummy 
variables. For example, for dependent variable; the bad loan equals to 1 and good loan equals 
to 0. In this study, the result provides statistically significant estimates for all coefficients of 
parameters, so it can precede the interpretation of loan default and the borrowers’ 
characteristics (Dimitrios Asteriou, 2006). 
 
Research Question Two examines whether the borrowers’ characteristics affect the volume of 
loan granted. Loan volume can be defined as the number and dollar amounts of new loans 
made during a period. The loan volume has been closely monitored by bank management, 
because it reflects both the market place and the bank’s lending strategy. Bard et al. (2000) 
argue that the borrowers’ characteristics could influence the lenders’ decision on the loan 
amount. The borrower characteristics that signal credit risk may affect the loan amount.  
 
Research Question Three examines how borrowers’ characteristics influence loan pricing. 
Pervious studies investigate the interest rate charged by the bank could determine not only by 
the demand for capital but also the riskiness of the borrowers. Banks are required to set the 
loan rate at the reasonable level to be consistent with the competition in financial marketplace. 
The rate is charged high enough to ensure the lenders are profitable and compensate the risks 
lenders involved. However, the rate also needs to be low enough to ensure the borrowers will 
not be driven away and can repay the loan (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Rose, 1993; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994). Thus, it is important for lenders to understand how the borrowers’ 
characteristics could influence the probability of mortgage loan default. 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is utilised in both credit availability and loan 
pricing models. The regression analysis could direct the causation of which variable is 
causing/affecting the others. The result defines the correlation between dependent and 
independent variables whether the relationship is statistically significant under certain degree 
of freedom (Thomas, 2005).  
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3.2 Sample data  
The research sample period is from 2004-2009. The data are obtained from one of the 
branches of the Construction Bank of China. The Construction Bank of China is one of the 
“big four” state owned banks in China. To date, it is ranked as the nation’s second largest 
state owned bank in China. The Construction Bank of China is the leader in Chinese 
mortgage lending, which accounts for about 70 percent of all mortgages issued in China 
(Construction Bank of China). In this research, the name of the branch bank cannot be 
disclosed due to the agreement with the manager of the branch bank that provided the data for 
this research. Thus, only the parent’s bank name can be announced. 
 
The bank provided the personal number of each mortgage loan applicants, the date on which 
the application was submitted, the status of each loan (good or bad); the amount of the loan 
that was granted; the interest rate range of each loan is charged, and the date on which the 
loans were obtained from the data file. However, we are not allowed to identify the branches 
that are included in the sample and are not allowed to use the data set for any other research.  
 
The data set included loans granted in 2004 to 2009. The total number of observations from 
the available data set was 7998 samples; the whole data set is from mortgage lending. The 
bank classifies loans with more than 90 days delay payment delay as default loans (bad loans). 
In the data set, there are 7681 good loans and 317 bad loans; the default rate is about 4.13%.  
 
Banks’ credit bureau recorded the personal information available on each applicant at the time 
the bank accesses the loan application, the unique personal number approved to each 
borrower. Before handing over the data for analysis, the personal numbers were removed, and 
the data for this research included borrowers’ personal information, such as gender, age, 
education level, annual income, marital status, loan duration, occupation, region, and banking 
rating for each borrower (“good” versus “ok”, “good”- if the borrower does not delay loan 
repayment, “ok”- if the borrower delays loan repayment).  
 
3.2.1 Segmentation of variables 
The variables used in this research overlaps with Crook (1992) as well as Dinh and Kleimeier 
(2007) list of commonly used variables for credit scoring model. Variables that are common 
to developing countries include gender, loan duration, marital status, and education. There are 
nine variables used in this research to assess the probability of mortgage loan default, loan 
availability and loan pricing. The variables are annual income, age, gender, marital status, 
education status, occupation, loan duration, region and bank rating. This is consistent with 
  - 26 - 
                                                                                                                                
Dinh and Kleimeier’s (2007), Jacobson and Roszbach (2003), Coval et al. (2000), Thomas 
(2000), Crook, Hamilton, and Thomas (1992)’s studies.  
 
According to Dinh and Leimeier’s (2007) study, income can be used as a proxy of the 
borrower’s financial wealth and ability to repay a loan. In this research, the annual income is 
categorized into two groups: annual income less than or equal to 36,000 RMB and annual 
income greater than 36,000 RMB. 
 
Age measures the borrower’s age in years. In this research, the age variable is categorized 
into three groups: 22-40 years old, 41-59 years old, and older than 59 year old. 
 
Marital status affects the borrowers’ responsibility, reliability, or maturity. According to Dinh 
and Kleimeier’s (2007) study, the marital status is typically related to the number of 
dependants of the borrower which reflects financial pressure on the borrower and his/her 
ability to repay the loan. Marital status in this study is classified into a dummy variable, 
where, married equal to one, and zero otherwise. 
 
Schreiner (2003) report there is ample evidence that woman default less frequently on loans. 
However, Schreiner (2004) discover gender effect disappears when other risk factors correlate 
with gender. However, we included gender in our model to test whether gender influence the 
probability of Chinese mortgage loan default.  
 
Regarding to education level, the better educated people is expected to have more stable, 
higher-income employment and thus a lower default rate. There are three categories of 
education level; university or higher, college graduated, and high school graduated or 
education level lower than high school.  
 
Occupation is highly correlated with income. Base on the eleven different occupations 
obtained from the sample, four categories are formed that pool occupations with similar 
default rates. The occupations are classified into group one as manager, group two as general 
staff, group three as professional employees and group four as others which include the 
military, farmer, teacher, consultant/broker, doctor, lawyer and journalist.  
 
Loan duration measures the maturity of loans in months. In China, the loan duration is 
proposed by the lenders, this variable reflects the borrower’s intention, risk aversion, or self-
assessment of repayment ability. Based on the sample, there are two groups of borrower’s 
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loan duration: short-term loan (less than or equal to 5 years) and long-term loan (longer than 5 
years). 
 
Region represents the area where the borrower lives. As people of similar wealth tend to live 
in the same location, this geographic criterion can indicate a borrower’s level of financial 
wealth. Region of the borrower is divided into two groups; within the district (in the same 
district where the bank is located) and out of the district (not in the same district where the 
bank is located). 
 
The bank’s rating relates to the borrower’s previous loan performance as well the relationship 
with the bank. In this study, the bank rating of the individual borrowers are categorized as 
good and ok (“good” represents the borrower does not delay loan repayment, and “ok” 
represents the borrower delays loan repayment). These banking rates relate to the issues of 
credit availability and the interest rate charged to the borrowers, especially to small or 
individual borrowers. Previous studies documented the borrower with a close relationship 
with the banks is more likely to have a lower cost of capital, lower required collateral, and 
greater availability of funds compared to a borrower without such relationship (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell , 2002). 
 
Finally, because the sample contains only information of applicants who were accepted, the 
research can not perceive how these applicants who were rejected would have performed if 
they had been accepted. In the research, the variables have been categorized into different 
groups, one group of the variable may not be shown in the results, because it used as the 
benchmark for other groups. For example, there are four groups of occupation: manager, 
general staff, professional employee and others, these are dummy variables and one dummy 
variable is dropped to avoid the dummy trap problem in the model.  
 
3.3 Research models  
The objectives of this research is to use the credit scoring model to examine the co-integration 
of the borrowers’ characteristics and banks loan granting decision, credit availability and loan 
pricing. According to the literature discussed in Chapter 2, mortgage loan default (credit 
scoring), credit availability, and loan pricing models are functions of the borrower’s 
characteristics and a set of dummy variables (see Equation 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). 
 
Mortgage loan default   = f (Borrower characteristics, Dummy variables)   (3.1) 
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Credit availability   = f (Borrower characteristics, Dummy variables) (3.2) 
 
Loan Price         = f (Borrower characteristics, Dummy variables)  (3.3) 
 
Where    Dependent variables are: 
• Mortgage loan default = 1 if loan is default (bad loan or not creditworthiness); 0 
if loan is paid (good loan or creditworthiness), 
• Credit availability = Volume of loan granted (in RMB), 
• Loan price = Interest rate range charged, excluding application fee, borrowing 
fee, and other fees; 
 
Borrower characteristics (Dummy variables) include:  
AGE (+/-) = Dummy variables for age group 
                    Age group 1; 1 if the applicant age is between 22 to 40 years old; 0  
                    otherwise 
                    Age group 2; 1 if the applicant age is between 41 to 59 years old; 0  
                    otherwise 
               Age group 3; 1 if the applicant age is equal or above 60 years old;     
               0 otherwise 
 
GENDER (+/-) = Dummy variable for gender; 1 if the applicant is female; 0  
                             otherwise 
 
MARITAL STATUS (+/-) = Dummy variable for marital status 
                                               1 if the applicant is married; 0 otherwise 
 
EDUCATION (+/-) = Dummy variables for education levels 
Educational level 1; 1 if the applicant completed a bachelor or 
higher degree; 0 otherwise  
Educational level 2; 1 if the applicant completed three years of 
college; 0 otherwise 
Educational level 3; 1 if the applicant completed primary 
school, middle school or high school; 0 otherwise 
           
ANNUAL INCOME (+/-) = Dummy variable for annual income level 
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1 if the applicant annual income level is 36,000 RMB 
or higher; 0 otherwise 
 
BANK RATING (+/-) = Dummy variable for bank rating 
1 if the applicant bank rating is good (borrower did not 
delay loan repayment); 0 if applicant bank rating is ok 
(borrower delays loan repayment) 
 
OCCUPATION (+/-) = Dummy variables for occupational status 
                                   Occupational status 1; 1 if the applicant is manager; 0   
                  otherwise 
                                   Occupational status 2; 1 if the applicant is general staff; 0  
                  otherwise 
                                   Occupational status 3; 1 if the applicant is a professional  
                            employee; 0 otherwise    
                                  Occupational status 4; 1 if the applicant is either a military,  
farmer, teacher, consultant/broker, doctor, lawyer or 
journalist; 0 otherwise 
 
DURATION (+/-) = Dummy variable for duration status 
                                 1 if the applicant borrowed long term loan (greater than or  
                                 equal to 5 years); 0 otherwise 
          REGION (+/-) = Dummy variable for region status 
                               1 if the applicant lives within the bank district; 0 otherwise 
 
The (+/-) indicate the hypothesised sign of the variables on mortgage loan default, credit 
availability, and loan pricing models. For example, annual income (+/-) is negatively related 
to the probability of bad loan, positively related to loan amount, but negatively related to the 
loan price. 
 
3.4 Estimation techniques 
The mortgage loan default (credit scoring) model will be analysed using logistic regression. 
According to Campbell and Dietrich (1983), the study estimate the loan default using data 
complied from the records of the bank. Horne (1997) employ the logistic regression to model 
bank’s lending decision. The study finds the applicant’s characteristics, such as age and 
marital status influence the decision of approval or denial the mortgage lending. 
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The mortgage loan default model is given as follows (Gujarati, 1995): 
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Where iY  equals to 1 if loan is paid (good loan); 0 if loan is defaulted (bad loan); 
iP  is the estimated probability of a good loan (high value of iP  implies        
                 low default risk); 
           
ij ijji
XZ εβα ++= ∑  
          α  and jβ  are an intercept term and parameters, respectively. 
  ijX  are Borrower characteristic, Credit risk proxies, Relationship  
          indicators and Dummy variables; 
          iε  is the error term, 
Equation 3.4 represents the cumulative logistic distribution function. If iP  is the probability 
of a good loan, then, the probability of a bad loan or (1- iP  ) given as follows: 
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Taking the natural log on Equation 3.5 becomes: 
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Where iZ  is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio in favour of a good loan. 
 
The model is a binary choice model and the use of the ordinary least square estimation 
technique is inappropriate (Maddala, 1983). Thus, to obtain efficient parameter estimates, the 
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maximum likelihood estimation is applied to the logistic regression. The likelihood function L 
for the model is given as follows (Maddala, 2001): 
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From Equation 3.7, the probability of a good loan can be obtained by the following equation 
(Greene, 1997):   
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The credit availability and loan pricing models are given as follow (see Equation 3.10)  
              
               iijj ji XY εβα ++= ∑     (3.10)                                                        
 
Where    iY  is interest charged; 
               α and jβ  are an intercept term and the parameters, respectively;  
               ijX  are Borrower characteristics and Dummy variables; 
               iε  is the error term. 
To estimate the credit availability and loan pricing models, the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method is utilised. 
 
3.4.1 Sensitive analysis  
The Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) is the empirical estimation of logit model; it 
assumes large sample properties of efficiency, consistency, normality of parameter estimates 
and validity of the t-test significance (Studenmund, 2001; Greene, 1993). Beside these 
properties, the logit model could help to avoid the major problem associated with Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) which estimate the standard linear probability model (Judge et al., 1982; 
Hair et al., 1998). The MLE coefficient estimates from the logit analysis have no direct 
interpretation with respect to the probability of the dependent variable (Loan default =1) other 
than indicating a direction of influence of probability. Liao (1994) and Maddala (1991) 
recommend calculating the changes in probabilities to indicate the magnitude of the marginal 
effect. It refers to the partial derivatives of the non-linear probability function at each 
variable’s sample mean (Liao, 1994; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
1989). In order to identify the most and the least important variables influencing the mortgage 
loan default (good loan versus bad loan), the marginal effect for each of the estimated 
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coefficients in the empirical model are calculated. The marginal effect reveals the marginal 
change in the dependent variable given a unit change in a selected independent variable, 
holding other variables constant ( Liao, 1994). The marginal effect indicates the level of 
important for the estimated coefficients in the empirical model.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter discusses the research questions, methodology, and data. Section two described 
the data source used in this study. Section three presents the research models. The empirical 
models and statistical test methods for the research questions are discussed in Chapter four. 
This includes a discussion of the logit, multiple regression test methods and the sensitive 
analysis of marginal effect test.        
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Chapter 4 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND RESULTS DISCUSIION 
 
 
 
This chapter reports the results on the mortgage loan default, credit availability and loan 
pricing models, and the factors affecting the lending decision models, amount of credits and 
loan prices. The estimated results reflect the borrower’s risk level, the amount of credit 
availability and the lending rate ranges. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 presents the results of the sample selection. 
Section 4.2 describes the characteristics of the sample data including the descriptive statistics. 
Following this, Section 4.3 discusses the results of mortgage loan default models, including 
the marginal effects. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss the estimated results on credit availability 
and loan pricing models, respectively. Section 4.6 summarises the research findings. 
 
4.1 Sample selection results 
The total sample from the mortgage loans of Construction Bank of China was 7,998. The loan 
data set includes 7,681 good loans and 317 bad loans (see Table 4.1). The average default rate 
for the total loans is 4.127%. The data set contained no missing observations. The samples 
include the borrowers’ demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, marital status, 
education, occupation, region), bank relationship indicators (such as loan amount, loan 
duration, bank rating, interest rate range), borrowers’ financial detail (such as annual income), 
and debt repayment history (such as the number of days that the loan repayment has been 
delayed). In this research, all loans are mortgage loans for individual borrowers. 
 
Table 4.1 Total Number of Mortgage Loans (Good and Bad Loans)  
Year Good loans  Bad loans  Default rate (in %) 
2004 706 37 5.24 
2005 2604 92 3.53 
2006 2061 92 4.46 
2007 1505 55 3.65 
2008 749 38 5.07 
2009(First quarter) 56 3 5.35 
Total 7681 317 4.13 
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Table 4.1 presents the distribution of good and bad loans by lenders’ identity from 2004 to the 
first quarter of 2009. Table 4.1 also shows the total amount of good loans issued is 
significantly larger than the total amount of bad loans issued. The number of mortgage loan 
increased significantly since 2005 to 2007. For example, the number of good loans increased 
from 706 to 2,604 from the year 2004 to 2005. This could be explained by China’s 
membership to the WTO, which has a serious effect on the Chinese mortgage loan market. 
Following China’s accession to the WTO, foreign lenders were allowed to participate in 
Chinese banking markets. Both domestic and foreign banks compete for the housing loans in 
China’s housing market. For example, at the end of October 2007, the outstanding residential 
housing loans reached 4.69 trillion RMB, a growth of 30.75%, up by 1.01 trillion RMB from 
the beginning of the year. This amounted 28.9% of the total new RMB loans of the 
commercial banks during the same period. The outstanding individual housing loan reached 
2.6 trillion RMB, 619.2 billion RMB more than the beginning of 2007 (Liu, 2007). 
Furthermore, the Chinese mortgage lending was heavily affected by the government monetary 
policies. In 2005, the personal mortgage loan researched 1.9 trillion RMB, an increased of 
12.8% compared to 2004. At the end 2006, the personal mortgage loan increased 19%, up by 
3.3% compared to the same time period in 2005. But in 2007, the amount of personal 
mortgage loan decreased compared to 2006. This is because of the government regulation and 
the tight monetary policy on mortgage lending. In January-December 2008, the personal 
mortgage loans amounted to RMB 357.3 billion, down from 29.7% compared to the pervious 
year (People’s Bank of China, 2009). Table 4.1 also shows the default rate has increased from 
3.53 percent to 5.07 percent from 2005 to 2008. The results show during this time period the 
lending amount has increased dramatically, but because of the lack of proper techniques in 
assessing credit risk, the default rate also increased. The results confirmed that a well-
developed credit scoring system is necessary for Chinese banks. This is consistent with Li and 
Zhang’s (2003) findings. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 Panel A: Descriptive statistics (sample from 2004 to 2006) 
  Age 
Annual income (in 
RMB) 
Loan 
duration Loan amount 
Days of 
overdue 
Mean 41.095 25619.132 9.558 84995.787 5.978
Standard 
Error 0.151 429.671 0.085 1030.827 0.507
Standard 
Deviation 8.846 25204.523 4.990 60477.1167 29.768
Minimum 21.919 8000 1 10000 0
Maximum 65.988 240000 20 490000 937
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics (sample from 2007 to the first quarter of 2009) 
 
  Age 
Annual income (in 
RMB) 
Loan 
duration Loan amount 
Days of 
overdue 
Mean 38.282 28589.341 10.234 87675.393 6.337
Standard 
Error 0.138 622.678 0.068 970.741 0.372
Standard 
Deviation 9.315 42029.60 4.553 65523.196 25.111
Minimum 22.958 7900 1 14000 0
Maximum 65.988 483600 20 437061 445
* 1 US Dollar ≈6.82 RMB 
 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the borrowers’ age, annual income, loan duration, 
loan amount, and the loan performance. Panel A in Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics 
for the sample from 2004 to 2006; and Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the 
sample from 2007 to the first quarter of year 2009.  
 
Table 4.2 also reports the borrowers’ mean annual income, loan duration, loan amount and 
days of overdue increase between Panel A and Panel B. In Panel B, the mean of borrowers’ 
age is slightly lower than those in Panel A, which indicates there are more young aged people 
applying for mortgage loans. The borrowers’ annual income increased from 25,619 RMB to 
28,589RMB; the loan duration increased from 9.6 years to 10.2 years; the average loan 
amount also increased from 84,995.79 RMB to 87,675.39 RMB; and the days of over due 
increased from 5.97 to 6.34 between the two sub samples. According to Thomas (2000) and 
Boyle et al.’s (1992) study, older borrowers are more risk adverse, and less likely to default. 
Loan duration measures the maturity of loans in months, which reflects the borrowers’ 
intention of the borrowing period, risk aversion, or self-assessment of repayment ability, and 
the longer the loan duration, the higher the borrowers’ default risk. According to Jacobson 
and Roszbach (2003), the decrease in borrowers’ age or increase in loan duration both 
increases the probability of loan default. There is a positive relationship between the 
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borrowers’ income and probability of default; higher income is associated with lower default 
rate. 
 
In Panel A, the standard deviation for the borrowers’ annual income (25204.5) and loan 
amount (84995.7) are extremely high. This indicates that the borrowers’ annual income and 
loan amount varies widely among the sample mean. The standard deviations for the 
borrowers’ age, the loan duration, and the days of overdue are 8.85, 4.99 and 29.77 
respectively. In Panel B, the standard deviation for the borrowers’ annual income and loan 
amount are similar to those in Panel A. The average borrowers’ age, annual income, loan 
duration, loan amount and the days of overdue are higher in the Panel B than in the Panel A. 
The results show the borrowers’ age decreased while the annual income, loan duration, loan 
amount and the days of overdue increased between the time period 2004 to 2006 and 2007 to 
the first quarter of 2009. This can be explained by the economic growth in China in the late 
1990s where peoples’ annual income increase, but the prices of new houses in China increase 
much faster.  The wage increase for the majority of urban households has not kept up with the 
rise in housing costs, which leads to an increase demand for housing loans (Burell, 2006). As 
banks try to capture a larger share of the housing market, some commercial banks lower their 
lending criteria, reduce loan application procedures and relax the borrowers’ background 
investigation through distorted practices (Liu, 2007). This could explain the increase of the 
loan default rate during this time period. 
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Table 4.3  Characteristics of borrowers and loans (2004-2009) 
Variable       Total  
  Good loans    Bad loans    
     
Loan repayment  7681  317 7998 
     
Volume of total loan 
granted  
688.9669 
million (RMB)   
28.8625 
million
(RMB)
717.8294 
million
（RMB） 
     
Borrower characteristics     
Gender      
_Female  2904  106 3010 
_Male  4777  211 4988 
Age      
          22-40 3949  216 4165 
           ≥ 40  3732  101 3833 
Education         
          < College 1432  102 1534 
          ≥ College  6249  215 6464 
Annual income      
        < 36000 (RMB) 7027  296 7323 
         ≥ 36000 (RMB) 654  21 675 
Marital status      
Married  4788  221 5009 
Un-married  2893  96 2989 
Loan duration     
Short term loan ( ≤ 5yrs) 2121  91 2212 
Long term loan  ( >  
5 yrs) 5560  226 5786 
Occupation     
Manager  1863  76 1939 
Stuff 4448  186 4634 
Professional 947  31 978 
Other 423  24 447 
Region      
Local (borrower living 
within the district) 7669  315 7984 
Un-local（borrower 
living outside the 
district） 12  2 14 
Bank rating     
Good (borrower who did 
not delay loan repayment) 4225  4 4229 
Ok (borrower who 
delayed loan repayment)  552   313 865 
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Table 4.3 shows the characteristics of the borrowers classified by loan performance as good 
or bad loans. A total of 7,998 new loans were issued from 2004 to 2009, where 7,681 (96.04 
percent) are considered as good loans and 317 (3.96 percent) are bad loans. According to 
Dinh and Kleimeier (2007), bad loans are classify as loans with more than 90 days of delay 
payment and can be treated as loan default. Following Dinh and Kleimeier’s classification, a 
total of 317 bad loans are considered as default loans. The data in Table 4.3 shows the default 
rate on average is higher among male borrowers than female borrowers; among age group 
between 22-40 years old and among low education level groups. 
 
The correlation matrix in Appendix Ⅰ shows the loan amount granted has a positive 
correlation with Interest, Age (1), Age (2), Education (1), Annual income, Region, Occupation 
type (2), and Bank rating. However, it is negatively correlated with Age (3), Education level 
(3), Occupation type (1) and Occupation type (4). The low and insignificant correlation 
coefficients between the loan amount granted and Gender (r = -0.01), Marital status (r = 0.00), 
Education level (2) (r = - 0.01), Occupation type (3) (r = 0.00) and between the loan amount 
granted and the Loan duration (r =0.00) imply that these variables do not impact the amount 
of credit granted.  
 
The correlation coefficients show Age group (2), Education level (1), Annual income, 
Occupation type (3) and Bank rating are negatively correlated with the loan default. On the 
other hand, Marital status, Education level (2), Region, Occupation type (1) and Duration are 
positively correlated with the loan default (see Appendix I). The correlation coefficient does 
not control for the other factors’ influence, and further investigation should be conducted to 
examine these relationships.   
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4.3 Mortgage loan default model  
The empirical estimation of the logit model used is Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE), 
which assumes large sample properties of consistency, efficiency, normality of parameter 
estimates and validity of the t-test significance (Studenmund, 2001; Greene, 1993). Given 
these properties, the logit model avoids the major problem associated with Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) estimation of the standard linear probability model (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, 
Lutkepohl, and Lee, 1982). The MLE coefficient estimates from the logit analysis have no 
direct interpretation with respect to the probability of the dependent variable (Y=1) other than 
indicating a direction of influence of probability. Liao (1994) and Maddala (1991) 
recommend calculating changes in probabilities to indicate the magnitude of the marginal 
effect. This refers to the partial derivatives of the non-linear probability function evaluated at 
each variable’s sample mean (Liao, 1994; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). As a result, in order 
to identify the most and the least important variables influencing the banks’ lending decision, 
the marginal effects for each of the estimated coefficients in the empirical model were 
calculated. The marginal effect reveals the marginal change in the dependent variable given a 
unit change in a selected independent variable, holding other variables constant (Liao, 1994). 
The marginal effect indicates the level of importance for the estimated coefficients in the 
empirical model.  
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Table 4.4 Mortgage loan default model (2004 to 2009) 
Number of Observations:   7997 
Log likelihood function:   -1106.248 
Restricted log likelihood:   -1349.780 
Chi-Squared Statistics:   487.0636 
Degrees of Freedom:              18 
Prob[ChiSqd > value]:   0.000000 
McFadden R2:                                              0.18042 
 Coefficients Std Error t-statistics Marginal Effects 
Loan Amount 
 
Interest rate(1) 
 
Interest rate(2) 
 
Gender 
 
Age (1) 
 
Age (2) 
 
Marital status 
 
Education (1) 
 
Education (2) 
 
Annual income 
 
Bank rating 
 
Occupation (1) 
 
Occupation (2) 
 
Occupation (3) 
 
Loan duration 
 
Region 
3.105012473 
 
0.5909588811 
 
0.5067970889 
 
-0.7999524478E-01 
 
-1.650097968 
 
-1.876146791 
 
0.1044613454 
 
-0.3059537648 
 
-0.3565166173E-03 
 
-0.4028412951 
 
-0.5972558099 
 
-0.4950888665 
 
-0.6053185713 
 
-0.8036251380 
 
0.1380944467 
 
-5.227391706 
 
     
0.63260217 
 
0.22974721 
 
0.18492724 
 
0.11901032 
 
0.26398226 
 
0.24730046 
 
0.12258393 
 
0.21417965 
 
0.16682475 
 
0.17497164 
 
0.20872121 
 
0.21926146 
 
0.20566173 
 
0.27012376 
 
0.13092320 
 
0.55996579 
 
      
4.908** 
 
2.572** 
 
2.741** 
 
-0.672 
 
-6.251** 
 
-7.587** 
 
0.852 
 
-1.428 
 
-0.002 
 
-2.302** 
 
-2.862** 
 
-2.258** 
 
-2.943** 
 
-2.975** 
 
1.055 
 
-9.335** 
 
   
0.4751713197E-01 
 
0.4712655758E-02 
 
0.3755480046E-02 
 
0.5037217488E-03 
 
-0.1261567876E-01 
 
-0.1172089233E-01 
 
0.6432009566E-03 
 
-0.1730050790E-02 
 
0.2223101219E-05 
 
-0.2955789748E-02 
 
-0.4928165859E-02 
 
-0.2750534552E-02 
 
-0.4015860309E-02 
 
-0.3809004189E-02 
 
0.8358586063E-03 
 
-0.9053778240E-01 
 
         
 
Note:  * *denote statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance 
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The mortgage loan default models (include the full sample model and two sub-sample 
models）are estimated using the logistic regression via the maximum likelihood estimation 
techniques. The estimated results of the full sample mortgage loan default model are 
presented in the Table 4.4. The table shows eleven out of sixteen predicted influencing factors 
are statistically significant (Chi-Square= 487.0636, P value= 0.000, degree of freedom = 18). 
The estimated coefficients in Table 4.4 are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level of significance. 
 
The negative (or positive) coefficient values in Table 4.4 imply decreases (or increases) in the 
probability of a loan default relative to the borrower’s characteristics.  For example, Loan 
amount, Interest range (1) and Interest range (2) positively impact the probability of loan 
default. An increase in the loan amount or interest rate level increases the probability of loan 
default (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
 
 Similarly, the coefficient Age group (1) (22 to 40 years old), Age group (2) (41 to 59 years 
old), Annual income, Bank rating, Occupation type (1) (manager), Occupation type (2) 
(general staff), Occupation type (3) (professional employee) and Region negatively impact the 
probability of loan default. This implies the demographic variables are significant in 
explaining the borrowers’ probability of default. For example, the Age group between 22 to 
59 years is less likely to default the loan, as the majority of borrowers in this age group are 
employed, have a steady income, and have the ability to repay their loans. As expected, the 
higher the respondents’ income the lower the probability of loan defaults. Income is 
commonly use as a proxy of the borrower’s financial wealth. For example, the probability of 
loan defaults of a borrower who earns an annual income higher than 36,000 RMB is lower 
than borrowers whose annual incomes are less than 36,000 RMB. The significant and negative 
coefficients for Occupation type (1) (manager), (2) (general staff), and (3) (professional 
employee) suggest that borrowers that are employed are less likely to default their loans. The 
results are consistent with Jacobson and Roszbach’s (2003) findings who argue that there is a 
negative relationship between income and the borrowers’ default rate; higher income would 
appear to be associated with lower default risk. Thomas (2000) and Boyle et al. (1992) 
confirm that older borrowers are more risk adverse, and therefore are less likely to default. 
Furthermore, banks are more hesitant to lend to younger borrowers who are more risk averse. 
Dinh and Kleimer (2007) discover that occupation is commonly incorporated into a credit 
scoring model since it is highly correlated with income. However, Gender, Marital status, 
Education level (1) and (2) ((1) = bachelor or higher degree, (2) = college graduate) and Loan 
duration are statistically insignificant in explaining the banks lending decision in this study. 
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Table 4.5 Mortgage loan default model (sub samples model with two different time 
periods) 
Panel A:  Mortgage loan default model (2004 to 2006) 
 
Number of Observations:   5595 
Log likelihood function:   -722.4542 
Restricted log likelihood:   -940.2830 
Chi-Squared Statistics:   435.6575 
Degrees of Freedom:               15 
Prob[ChiSqd > value]:   0.000000 
McFadden R2:                                              0. 23166 
 Coefficients Std Error t-statistics Marginal Effects 
Loan Amount 
 
Interest rate(1) 
 
Interest rate(2) 
 
Gender 
 
Age (1) 
 
Age (2) 
 
Marital status 
 
Education (1) 
 
Education (2) 
 
Annual income 
. 
Bank rating 
 
Occupation(1) 
 
Occupation(2) 
 
Occupation(3) 
 
Loan duration 
 
Region 
 
0.3247914589E-02 
 
1.811986168 
 
1.505638373 
 
-0.4376850643E-01 
 
-1.923722108 
 
-2.195525276 
 
-0.6450714823E-02 
 
-0.3527133039 
 
-0.1008168646 
 
-1.825351673 
 
-0.7473880542 
 
-1.507709939 
 
-1.227101956 
 
-1.458532266 
 
0.1868483820 
 
-4.932877165 
 
0.11618745E-02 
 
0.29353797 
 
0.24583051 
 
0.14546516 
 
0.31674529 
 
0.29351574 
 
0.15009772 
 
0.26906577 
 
0.20698375 
 
0.19669382 
 
0.23962219 
 
0.30570540 
 
0.24960676 
 
0.31758507 
 
0.16521067 
 
0.59085852 
 
2.795** 
 
6.173** 
 
6.125** 
 
-0.301 
 
-6.073** 
 
-7.480** 
 
-0.043 
 
-1.311 
 
-0.487 
 
-9.280** 
 
-3.119** 
 
-4.932** 
 
-4.916** 
 
-4.593** 
 
1.131 
 
-8.349** 
 
0.1758102664E-04 
 
0.2277236848E-01 
 
0.1441588596E-01 
 
0.2382276411E-03 
 
-0.1422129515E-01 
 
-0.1149939075E-01 
 
-0.3494832272E-04 
 
-0.1696130596E-02 
 
-0.5541667429E-03 
 
0.1532525561E-01 
 
-0.5755212538E-02 
 
-0.5319890456E-02 
 
-0.8705693840E-02 
 
-0.5061000020E-02 
 
0.9608605911E-03 
 
-0.6956058859E-01 
 
Note:  * *denote statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance 
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Panel B:  Mortgage loan default model (2007 to 2009) 
 
 
Number of Observations:   2403 
Log likelihood function:   -323.1416 
Restricted log likelihood:   -409.5255 
Chi-Squared Statistics:   172.7677 
Degrees of Freedom:              15 
Prob[ChiSqd > value]:   0.000000 
McFadden R2:                                              0. 21094 
 Coefficients Std Error t-statistics Marginal Effects 
Loan Amount 
 
Interest rate(1) 
 
Interest rate(2) 
 
Gender 
 
Age (1) 
 
Age (2) 
 
Marital status 
 
Education (1) 
 
Education (2) 
 
Annual income 
. 
Bank rating 
 
Occupation(1) 
 
Occupation(2) 
 
Occupation(3) 
 
Loan duration 
 
Region 
 
 
0.1579846766E-02 
 
0.48995532310 
 
0.8159748171 
 
-0.4828111667E-01 
 
-1.819914563 
 
-1.843899819 
 
-0.1253452502 
 
-0.5348950401 
 
-0.6259355024E-01 
 
-1.240288089 
 
-1.048138946 
 
-0.2014353287E-01 
 
-0.2903971631 
 
-0.7895297292 
 
0.5521074946E-01 
 
-4.971146481 
 
  
0.23619264E--02 
 
0.45353809 
 
0.30624971 
 
0.22249812 
 
0.48756930 
 
0.45563371 
 
0.22814849 
 
0.38105172 
 
0.30575976 
 
0.25159530 
 
0.37698950 
 
0.33844851 
 
0.36317753 
 
0.55802590 
 
0.22392601 
 
1.0082568 
 
0.669 
 
1.080 
 
2.664** 
 
-0.217 
 
-3.733** 
 
-4.047** 
 
-0.549 
 
-1.404 
 
-0.205 
 
-4.930** 
 
-2.780** 
 
-0.060 
 
-0.800 
 
-1.415 
 
0.247 
 
-4.930** 
 
0.9667455472E-05 
 
0.3650561278E-02 
 
0.6654401297E-02 
 
-0.2939009868E-03 
 
-0.1253355758E-01 
 
-0.1271038646E-01 
 
0.7578151029E-03 
 
-0.2833061904E-02 
 
-0.3867139286E-03 
 
0.1159873951E-01 
 
-0.1077622366E-01 
 
-0.1231574193E-03 
 
-0.1712211786E-02 
 
-0.3613772208E-02 
 
0.3364161128E-03 
 
-0.7600265674E-01 
 
 
Note:  * *denote statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance 
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Table 4.1 shows that the lending amount dropped significantly from 2006 to 2007; and the 
descriptive statistics shows the mean and standard deviations of Age, Annual income, Loan 
duration, Loan amount, Days of overdue are different in the different time period (see Table 
4.2). According to Mays (2001) and Thomas et al. (2001) , if the sample’s internal differences 
is large and the sample size is big enough, in order to improve the model prediction accuracy, 
the sample should be divided into sub-sample to test the credit scoring model. Table 4.5 
shows the sub samples of the mortgage loan default model in the two different time periods; 
the first model includes time period from 2004 to 2006 and the second model from 2007 to 
the first quarter of 2009. The estimated coefficients in Table 4.5 are statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level.  Panel A shows eleven out of sixteen predicted influencing factors are 
statistically significant (Chi-Square =435.6575, P value= 0.000, degree of freedom= 18).  
Panel B shows six out of sixteen predicted influencing factors are statistically significant 
(Chi-Square = 172.7677, P value= 0.000, degree of freedom= 15) 
 
The data in Panel A in Table 4.5 shows the coefficients Loan amount, Interest rate (1), 
Interest rate (2) are positively correlated with loan default; Age (1) (22 to 40 years old), Age 
(2) (41 to 59 years old), Annual income, Bank rating, Occupation (1) (manager), Occupation 
(2) (general staff), Occupation (3) (professional employee), and Region are negatively 
correlated with the probability of loan default. The results are similar to the full sample model. 
For example, annual income is commonly used as a proxy of the borrower’s financial wealth, 
and the result shows the probability of loan default of the borrower who earns an annual 
income higher than 36,000 RMB is lower than the borrower whose annual income is less than 
36,000 RMB. 
 
Panel B shows the time period 2007 to the first quarter of year 2009. The results show Interest 
rate (2) is positively correlated with loan default; and Age(1), Age(2) Annual income, Bank 
rating and Region are negatively correlated  with the probability of loan default. 
 
The results in the Table 4.5 reflect the changing economic conditions during the two time 
periods. For example, China became a member of WTO in 2006 and foreign lenders are 
allowed to participate in the Chinese banking markets. The competition between domestic and 
foreign banks could potentially intensify the underlying risks in the Chinese housing markets. 
As banks try to capture a larger share of the housing loan markets, some commercial banks 
lowered their lending criteria; relaxed the borrower’s background investigation through 
distorted practice (Liu, 2007). Therefore, the loan amount increased dramatically from 2006 
to 2007 and this could lead to an increase of the probability to default by the borrowers. 
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4.3.1 Interpretation of the marginal effects 
 
Table 4.6 shows the marginal effects of the full sample mortgage loan default model. The 
marginal effects show changes in the conditional probability results from the changes in the 
independent variables. For example, a unit change in the increment in the borrower’s total 
loan amount value would increase the probability of a bad loan by 4.75%. Furthermore, for 
borrowers in the 22 to 40 years old age group, the probability of loan default decreases by 
1.17%, and for borrowers in the 41 to 59 years old age group, the probability of loan default 
decreases by 1.26%.  
 
 
Table 4.6 Marginal effects of the full size mortgage loan default model 
Variables  Marginal effects   Importance Ranking  
Loan Amount 0.0475 2 
Interest rate (1) 0.471 6 
Interest rate (2) 0.376 7 
Age (1) -0.126 3 
Age(2) -0.117 4 
Annual income  -0.296 10 
Bank rating -0.493 5 
Occupation (1) -0.275 11 
Occupation (2) -0.402 8 
Occupation (3) -0.381 9 
Region  -0.905 1 
 
 
Types of occupation also impact the probability of loan default. For  example, if the borrower 
is a manager (Occupation (1)), the probability of loan default decreases by 0.275%; if the 
borrower is a general staff (Occupation (2)) the probability of loan default decreases by 
0.402%; and if the borrower is a professional employee (Occupation 3), the probability of 
loan default decreases by 0.381%. If bank rating for the borrower is good, the probability of 
the loan default decreases by 0.493%; and if the region of the borrower is local, the 
probability of the loan default decrease by 9.05%.  
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4.3.2 Important factors to banks in lending decisions  
According to the marginal effect variables (see Table 4.6), when a bank makes a lending 
decision, the bank should rank the risk factor from the most important to the least important 
factor in making the lending decision. The marginal effects show how strongly these 
independent variables influence the mortgage loan default.  
 
From Table 4.6, we may conclude that the lenders rank the borrower’s region as the most 
important factor when making their lending decision. This implies that the borrowers’ region 
may affect the mortgage loan default. Loan amount and the age group between 22 to 40 years 
old are the second and third important variables impacting mortgage loan default, respectively. 
The age group between 41 to 59 years old is the fourth most important variable impacting the 
lenders’ decision. The borrower’s bank rating is the fifth most important factor impacting the 
lending decision. Interest range (1) and (2) are the sixth and seventh factors influencing the 
mortgage loan default. Professional employee followed by general staff is the ninth important 
factors influencing the mortgage loan default. The borrower’s annual income greater than 
36,000 RMB is the tenth most important factor affecting mortgage loan default. However, 
Occupation (1) (managers) is the least important variable influencing the mortgage loan 
default. 
 
In summary, the results from the logistic regression models reveal the factors that determine 
mortgage loan default include demographic characteristics (Age, Gender, Marital status, 
Education, Occupation and Region), bank relationship indicators (Loan amount, Loan 
duration, Bank rating and Interest rate range), and the borrower’s financial detail (Annual 
income). The results suggest that an increase in the loan amount or interest rate increases the 
probability of loan default. In addition the increase in Age group (1), (2) ((1) =22 to 40 years 
old, (2) =41 to 59 year old), Annual income, Bank rating, Occupation type (1) (manager), (2) 
(general staff), and (3) (professional employee) decreases the loan default rate. The results are 
consistent with Dinh and Kleimeier (2007) and Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) findings. 
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4.4 Credit availability model  
The estimated results of the ordinary least square (OLS) regressions for the credit availability 
model is shown in Table 4.7. The results show that all explanatory variables can explain 55 
percent of the total variation in the credit availability. The results indicate that the model fits 
the data quite well. 
 
Table 4.7  Effects of Borrowers’ Characteristics on Bank Loan Availability  
Dependent variable:               Loan amount 
Method:                                  Ordinary Least Squared  
Number of Observations:  7997 
Log likelihood function:  -5134.1599 
Restricted log likelihood:  -5235.7876 
R-Squared Statistics:              0.55096 
 
 Coefficients Std Error t-statistics P-value 
statistics 
Gender 
 
Age(1) 
 
Age(2) 
 
Marital status 
 
Education (1) 
 
Education (2) 
 
Annual income 
 
Bank rating 
 
Occupation(1) 
 
Occupation(2) 
 
Occupation(3) 
 
Loan duration 
 
Region 
0.8743946899E-02 
 
0.1626502149 
 
0.1584651285 
 
0.8417023603E-03 
 
0.3989511067E-01 
 
0.7859162553E-02 
 
0.733735306E-02 
 
0.2211610804E-01 
 
0.7850838277E-01 
 
0.6613715583E-01 
 
0.7672546138E-01 
 
-0.7063415883E-02 
 
0.1527864145 
 
 
0.10564658E-01 
 
0.26187620E-01 
 
0.25181129E-01 
 
0.10686562E-01 
 
0.18074910E-01 
 
0.14559287E-01 
 
0.17761595E-01 
 
0.20098137E-01 
 
0.23012222E-01 
 
0.21841237E-01 
 
0.25572066E-01 
 
0.11784720E-01 
 
0.10266333E-01 
 
 
0.828 
 
6.211** 
 
6.293** 
 
0.079 
 
2.207** 
 
0.540 
 
0.413 
 
1.100 
 
3.412** 
 
3.028** 
 
3.000** 
 
-0.599 
 
14.882** 
 
 
0.4079 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.9372 
 
0.0273** 
 
0.5893 
 
0.6795 
 
0.2712 
 
0.0006** 
 
0.0025** 
 
0.0027** 
 
0.5489 
 
0.0000** 
 
Note:  * *denote statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance 
  
 
Table 4.7 shows the estimated coefficients Age group (2) (41 to 59 years old), Education level 
(1) (bachelor or higher degree), Occupation type (1) (manager), Occupation type (2) (general 
staff), Occupation type (3) (professional employee), and Region are highly significant and 
positively correlated with banks credit availability. For example, the coefficient Age group 
between 41 to 59 years old showed that senior borrowers are more likely to grant a larger 
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amount of loan. Senior borrowers are more risk adverse and will therefore be less likely to 
default. Thomas (2000) and Boyle et al. (1992) confirm this empirically, where banks are 
more hesitant to lend to younger borrowers who are more risky and tend to default their loans 
repayment. Borrowers with a university or post graduate degree are more likely to obtain 
bigger loans, because these borrowers have a better capability to repay the loan. Dinh and 
Kleimeier (2007) argue that better educated borrowers have a more stable employment and 
higher income, thus have a lower default rate. Banks prefer to retain these customers with a 
large amount loan. The positive coefficient of Occupation types (1) (manager), (2) (general 
staff), and (3) (professional employee) show that borrowers who are employed, and worked as 
a manager, a general staff, or a professional employee should have a low earning volatility. 
 
The above results are consistent with Bard et al.’s (2000) findings who argue that the 
borrowers’ characteristics affect the loan amount. Similarly, Limsombunchai et al.’s (2005) 
study show that the borrower with a low earning volatility, a high asset value, high average 
earnings, high education, high work experience, and high profitability would be granted a 
larger loan.  
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4.5 Loan pricing model 
Multiple linear regression is used to estimate the loan pricing model. The results of the 
regression model are presented in Table 4.8. The volume of credit is not included in the loan 
pricing model, since it is assumed to be an endogenous variable.  
 
Table 4.8 Effects of Borrowers’ Characteristics on Loan Pricing model 
Dependent variable:               Interest rate rang 
Method:                        Ordinary Least Squared  
Number of Observations:   7997 
Log likelihood function:   -8466.6207 
Restricted log likelihood:   -8048.4137 
R-Squared Statistics:               0.110256 
 
 Coefficients Std Error t-statistics P-value statistics 
Gender 
 
Age(1) 
 
Age(2) 
 
Marital status 
 
Education (1) 
 
Education (2) 
 
Annual income 
 
Bank rating 
 
Occupation(1) 
 
Occupation(2) 
 
Occupation(3) 
 
Loan duration 
 
Region 
-0.4928939889E-01 
 
-1.620136738 
 
-1.639682776 
 
-0.5512506384E-01 
 
-0.3386618553E-01 
 
0.2112611130E-01 
 
-0.1495664916 
 
-0.4511061610 
 
-0.3294403796 
 
-0.3522479831 
 
-0.3734204863 
 
0.9633629149E-01 
 
-0.1645126270 
 
 
0.16047701E-01 
 
0.46059903E-01 
 
0.43873026E-01 
 
0.16271656E-01 
 
0.27553649E-01 
 
0.22265456E-01 
 
0.26978619E-01 
 
0.34091991E-01 
 
0.35365670E-01 
 
0.33640920E-01 
 
0.39189367E-01 
 
0.17896327E-01 
 
0.15583306E-01 
 
 
-3.071** 
 
-35.175** 
 
-37.373** 
 
-3.388** 
 
-1.229 
 
0.949 
 
-5.544** 
 
-13.232** 
 
-9.315** 
 
-10.471** 
 
-9.529** 
 
5.383** 
 
-10.557** 
 
 
0.0021** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0007** 
 
0.2190 
 
0.3427 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
Note:  * *denote statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance  
 
The estimated coefficient Loan duration is positively correlated with the loan price and 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance (see Table 4.8). This shows that the 
borrower who maintains a longer relationship with the bank would have a lower borrowing 
cost. The result is consistent with the findings of Berger and Udell (1990), Berger and Udell 
(1995), and Bodenhorn (2003). 
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The estimated coefficients Gender, Age (1) (22 to 40 years old), Age (2) 41 to 59 years old), 
Marital status, Annual income, Bank rating, Occupation (1) (manager), Occupation (2) 
(general staff), Occupation (3) (professional employee) and Region are significant and 
negatively influence the loan pricing model. The mortgage loan default model showed that the 
factors except Gender are negatively correlated to the probability to default (see Table 4.4). 
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the loan price and credit risk, which 
indicates the higher interest rate attract riskier applicants. For example, applicants with low 
annual income have a higher probability to default, thus, the loan price is relatively high for 
the low income applicants. This is consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Petersen and 
Rajan’s (1994) findings. 
 
Education has no significant impact on the loan price. It could be due to when duration is 
introduced into the model, the influence of some of the borrowers’ characteristics could be 
eliminated by the length of the bank-borrower relationship. This result is consistent with 
Limsonbunchai et al.’s (2005) study.  
 
The results in Table 4.8 confirm that the borrowers’ demographic characteristics (such as 
gender, age, marital status, annual income and region) negatively impact the bank’s mortgage 
loan price. Furthermore, the longer the relationship the borrower has with the bank, the lower 
the borrowing cost they will have to pay. In addition, a higher bank rating leads to a lower 
loan price; the borrower who does not delay his or her loan repayment will be rated as “good” 
borrower. Bodenhorn (2003), Athavale and Edmister (1999), Blackwell and Winters (1997), 
and Berger and Udell (1995) find evidence of an inverse relationship between the bank-
borrower relationship and loan price, which shows that the good relationship between the 
bank and borrower could result in a lower loan rate. 
4.6 Summary of findings 
In this study, we developed and analysed three models (Mortgage loan default model, Credit 
availability model, Loan pricing model) of the Chinese residential mortgage markets. The 
mortgage loan default model was divided into two sub-sample; the first sub-sample model is 
from year 2004 to 2007, the second sub-sample model is from year 2007 (see Table 4.5). 
From our results, we can conclude that the borrower’s demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, marital status, education, occupation and region), bank’s relationship indicators (loan 
amount, loan duration, bank rating and interest charged) and borrower’s financial detail 
( annual income) significantly affect banks’ lending decision, loan amount granted and loan 
price charged. 
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For the mortgage loan default model, we divide the full sample into two sub- samples. Our 
result shows the factors affect the mortgage loan default model varies in different time period 
since the economic condition changes during the two time periods. The empirical result 
confirms that banks in screening and monitoring borrowers require reviewing the borrower’s 
credit worthiness periodically. 
 
For credit availability, the borrower’s with the lower default risk tends to get a bigger amount 
of bank loan. This confirms the finding of Limsombunchai et al. (2005), which suggest 
borrowers with lower earning volatility, high asset value, high average earnings, higher 
education, and longer work experience could be granted a larger loan. 
 
Moreover, our results suggest that the loan price is positively correlated with the credit risk, 
where a higher interest rate draws riskier applicants, and an increase in the interest rate 
increases the average riskiness of the borrowers. This result is consistent with Stiglitz and 
Weiss’s (1981) study. 
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Chapter 5 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This chapter summarises the research. Section 5.1 presents a summary of the research 
objectives, data and methodology, and major findings. The implications of the research 
findings are discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the research limitations and 
Section 5.4 provides recommendations for further research. 
 
5.1 Summary and major findings 
Credit scoring is broadly applied in consumer lending, especially in credit cards, and has been 
used in mortgage lending recently. Mester’s (1997) study discovered that credit scoring is a 
cost effective credit management tool for banks to evaluate loan applications. Based on 
Berger and Frame’s (2007) and Turvey and Brown (1990) studies, credit scoring uses the 
borrower’s financial history and financial statement to evaluate the credit risk of loan 
applications. It is a statistical approach to predict the probability whether a credit applicant 
will default or become delinquent. 
 
In China, the rigorous risk management systems have been implemented and practised by 
most banks, but financial fraud happens often, and the bad loans of state owned commercial 
banks’ portfolio are huge. Since China becomes a member of the WTO, the degree of Chinese 
economy opening would be higher, consumer credit activity will further extend, and 
consumer credit problem will increase. For example, some local bank officers of Chinese 
commercial banks lower the lending criteria, reduce the examination steps and relax 
investigation through distorted practice to increase market share of the credit market. A few 
branches and sub-branches of Chinese commercial banks even collaborate with real estate 
developers to provide housing mortgage loan contracts and these loans are used to help 
developers to speculate on difficult-to-sell buildings (Liu, 2007). Therefore, it is important for 
Chinese banks to practise a robust consumer credit scoring system, providing reasonable 
information to decision makers to guarantee the financial order and stability in the Chinese 
financial market.  
 
This research is expected to contribute to the development of Chinese mortgage market in 
additional to analysing the rational behaviour of mortgage loan default processes. The 
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purpose of this research is to identify critical factors in the mortgage loan default process and 
to investigate factors affecting the amount of credit granted and interest rate charged for 
Chinese mortgage lending. 
 
The data used in this research are obtained from a branch of the Construction bank of China, a 
major lender in Chinese mortgage sector. During the period of 2004 to 2009, a total of 7998 
credit files under the mortgage loan scheme were obtained. The credit scoring model is 
analysed using the logistic regression with the maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
5.2 Results and implications 
5.2.1 Results for research objective one and implications 
Objective one of this research is to identify the factors in mortgage lending decision process 
of Chinese banks. Our results of mortgage loan default models show that the borrower’s 
demographic characteristics impact banks’ lending decision process. The empirical results 
suggest the Loan amount and Interest range are positively correlated with the probability of 
loan default; which means an increase in the loan amount or interest rate level increases the 
probability of loan default. There are seven variables negatively impact the probability of loan 
default, such as age group between 22 to 59 years old, annual income greater than 36,000 
RMB, good bank rating (no delayed loan repayment history), manager (occupation type (1)), 
general staff (occupation type (2)), professional employee (occupation type (3)), borrower 
resides within the same district with the bank. For example, if the borrower’s annual income 
level is higher than 36,000 RMB, the probability of loan default for the borrower will be 
lower. The results are consistent with Dinh and Kleimer (2007) Jacobson and Roszbach 
(2003), Thomas (2000), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Boyle et al. (1992), and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). 
 
The full sample period of this research is from the year 2004 to the first quarter of 2009, and 
the banks lending amount has dropped dramatically from 2006 to 2007. Based on Thomas et 
al. (2001) and Mays’s (2001) studies, further tests should be performed on the sample’s 
internal differences problem. Therefore, the full sample of the mortgage loan default model is 
divided into the different time periods (2004 to 2006, and 2007 to the first quarter of 2009).  
 
Our results indicate during the different lending period and as the economic condition 
changes, there are different numbers of factors which impact the mortgage loan default 
process. The sub sample (2004 to 2006) results are similar to the full size sample where loan 
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amount and interest range are positively correlated with the probability of loan default. 
Demographic characteristics of age group between 22 to 59 years old, annual income greater 
than 36,000 RMB, good bank rating, occupation such as manager, general staff, and 
professional employee and local borrower negatively impact the probability of loan default. 
But in the sub sample from 2007 to the first quarter of 2009, there are only six factors which 
impact the mortgage loan default model, higher range of interest charged is positively 
correlated to the loan default; age group between 22 to 40 and 41 to 59 years old, annual 
income, good bank rating and local borrower are negatively correlated to the probability of 
loan default.  
 
The results in this research show that the borrower’s demographic characteristics could affect 
the mortgage loan default process. A good credit scoring model has the ability to detect bad 
loans; this could help the bank to reduce the loan losses from loan default. Consequently, it 
can improve the profitability and the financial stability of the bank. Therefore, the credit 
scoring model should be developed and used to support credit officers in monitoring the 
Chinese mortgage loan applications. The results also show it is necessary to review the 
borrowers’ creditworthiness periodically, as the changes in economic condition could affect 
the loan performance; this is consistent with McAllister and Mingo’s (1994) finding. 
 
5.2.2 Results for research objective two and implications 
Research objective two is to investigate the factors affecting the volume of credit granted by 
Chinese banks. Our results suggest that age group between 41 to 59 years old, university or 
post graduated, occupation types such as manager, general staff, and professional employee, 
and local borrower are highly significant and positively correlated to banks’ credit availability. 
The results show that the borrower with a low earning volatility, a high asset value, high 
average earnings, high education, high work experience, and high profitability would be 
granted a larger loan, which is consistent with Boyle et al. (1992), Bard et al. (2000), Thomas 
(2000), Limsombunchai et al. (2005), and Dinh and Kleimeier’s (2007) findings.  
 
The results in this research show that the borrower’s demographic characteristics that 
signal credit risk may affect the loan amount. A good model could help the bank to 
determine the optimal level of credit extended to the borrower. As a result, this could 
limit the borrowers to borrow from more expensive or non-financial institution 
lenders (such as loan sharks). 
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5.2.3 Results for research objective three and implications 
Multiple linear regressions are used to estimate the loan pricing model. Our results show that 
Loan duration is positively correlated with the loan price and statistically significant at the 
5% level. There are nine variables significantly and negatively correlated with the loan 
pricing model, such as female, age group between 22 to 59 years old, married, annual income 
is greater than 36,000 RMB, good bank rating (no delayed loan repayment history), manager 
(occupation (1)), general stuff (occupation (2)), professional employee (occupation (3)), 
borrower resides within the district with the bank. For example, according to Dinh and 
Kleimeier’s (2007) study, the default rate for female is less than male. Thus, the loan charge 
for female will be lower than male. 
 
The results in this research show that the borrower’s demographic characteristics 
could affect the loan price. The results suggest that borrowers could consider 
swapping banks less frequently to keep a good repayment history and maintain a 
better relationship with the bank; this could help to lower the borrowing cost. For 
example, the longer and better the relationship the borrower has with the bank, the 
lower the borrowing cost, which is consistent with Berger an Udell (1995), Blackwell 
and Winters (1997), Athaval and Edmister (1999), and Bodenhorn’s (2003) findings.  
 
5.3 Research limitations 
There are a number of limitations related to the data set, the estimation techniques, and the 
variables used in this research. These include: 
 
Firstly, the data set used in this research is from one branch of Construction bank of China. 
Therefore, the results in this research have limited implications and robustness. The results 
can not represent the lending behaviour of all commercial banks in the mortgage lending in 
China. 
 
Secondly, only the data and information of the applicants who have been granted a credit in 
the past are used in the study. There is no data and information on the applicants who were 
rejected. Thus, the models are parameterized using a sample of accepted applicants only. This 
may lead to biased estimates of the parameters. For example, equation (3.1) is used to 
examine the effect of the various borrowers’ characteristics on whether loans are defaulted or 
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not, but not what criteria the bank used to make their loans decision. This is due to the 
limitation of the data. There is no data and information on the applicants whose loans were 
rejected. Thus the model is parameterized using a sample of accepted applicants only. 
Therefore, equation (3.1) examines only the effect of the various borrowers’ characteristics on 
whether loans are defaulted or not after the lending decision has been made. 
 
 
Thirdly, the model ignores the potential exposure to the future credit risk. The credit scoring, 
credit availability and loan pricing models are typically static models in nature and they 
ignore the potential exposure to future credit risk In addition, the information about financial 
distress of the borrowers’ in the past is not included in the models. Thus, the credit scoring 
model and judgmental technique can be combined to improve the probability of mortgage 
loan default, which can help the bank to make better lending decisions in terms of assessing 
the credit quality ex-ante based on the borrowers’ characteristics and loan evaluators’ 
personal experience. 
 
Table 5.1- Impact of borrowers’ characteristics on the mortgage loan default, loan 
availability and loan pricing models 
 
Mortgage loan default model( Full Sample) Bank loan availability model Loan pricing model 
Loan amount       (+)   
Interest rate(1)     (+)   
Interest rate(2)     (+)   
Age(1)                  (-) Age(1)              (+) Age(1)                (-) 
Age(2)                  (-) Age(2)              (+) Age(2)                (-) 
Annual income     (-)  Annual income   (-) 
Bank rating          (-)  Bank  rating        (-) 
Occupation(1)      (-) Occupation(1)   (+) Occupation(1)    (-) 
Occupation(2)      (-) Occupation(2)   (+) Occupation(2)    (-) 
Occupation(3)      (-) Occupation(3)   (+) Occupation(3)    (-) 
Region                 (-) Region              (+) Region               (-) 
 Education(1)     (+) Loan duration    (+) 
 
Fourthly, the research findings identify some important borrowers’ characteristics which 
impact both the mortgage loan default and the availability and pricing of loans. Table 5.1 
shows the influence of the borrowers’ characteristics with the three models are different. For 
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example, annual income and bank rating impact the mortgage loan default and loan pricing, 
but not bank loan availability. However, the parameters which affect the borrowers’ 
probability to default should also affect the loan amount and loan pricing. Table 5.1 shows 
there is a positive relationship between Loan amount and Mortgage loan default. Petersen and 
Rajan (1994) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) revealed that an increase in the loan amount or 
interest rate level increases the probability of loan default. This inconsistency in our results 
could be due to the credit scoring model which is not wildly used in Chinese banks and the 
credit assessment and management tool of Chinese banks are outdated. Most Chinese banks 
depend on the experience and common knowledge of credit evaluators in assessing credit risk. 
These evaluators can not ensure lenders are applying the same underwriting criteria to all 
borrowers (Mester, 1997). Therefore, the findings of this research suggest the credit scoring 
model should be developed to assist credit officers in processing Chinese mortgage loan 
applications.  
 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
To improve the research results and to increase the generalisability of the research findings, 
the credit file from other commercial banks can be collected and included in the data set. 
Furthermore, the number of the sample of borrowers should be increased and the information 
of the applicants who did not qualify for the credit should be taken into account. 
 
In addition, there are a number of variables that can be added to the models to enhance the 
performance of the models. These include geographic distance between the lending bank and 
the borrower (see Degryse and Ongena, 2005), the number of loans with the current bank 
(Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007), the borrower’s credit bureau score (see Wu and Wang, 2000; 
Athavale and Edmister, 1999; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998), and the management ability of the 
borrower (see Angelini et al., 1998; Ellinger et al., 1992).  
 
This study only provides a single estimation of the credit scoring model. The combination 
models could be used in the future study. For example, the study could combine the logit and 
artificial neural net works (ANN) together, where the calculation of the neural network 
weights is known as training process. The process starts by randomly initialising connection 
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weights and introduces a set of data inputs and actual outputs to the network. The network 
then calculates the network output and compares the actual output, and then calculates the 
error. In an attempt to improve the overall predictive accuracy and to minimise the network 
total mean squared error, previous study discovered that neural network model offers a more 
flexible and efficient framework to analyse economic and financial relationships than can be 
potentially highly nonlinear. The neural network examines all information at once, thus 
facilitating a highly automated input interface (Wu and Wang, 2000). 
 
In practice, banks need to update their credit scoring model on a regular basis. For developing 
countries where economic changes should more pronounced than the relatively stable 
developed countries. A regular update of the credit scoring model is even more important for 
banks in developing countries. Furthermore, it might be interesting to compare credit scoring 
models of banking markets that are in various stages of development. This way could explore 
any linkages that exist between the features that determine loan default, for example, the 
variables included in the credit scoring model and their relative importance, and financial and 
economic development (Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007). 
 
Collateral requirement is considered as another key issue in the lending decision process. 
However, it has not been addressed in this research. Therefore, further research can be 
extended to include the determinants of collateral (what factors determine the extent of total 
debt collateralization) and the influence of the bank-borrower relationship on the collateral 
requirement. These could be achieved by using the multiple regression analysis and the 
artificial neural networks techniques. 
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Appendix: Correlation Matrix 
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-
0.26**
-
0.03**
-
0.67** 1.00     
O3  0.00 
-
0.02**
-
0.02** 0.00 0.06** 
-
0.05**
-
0.03**
-
0.04**
-
0.03** 0.03** -0.01 
-
0.07** 0.00
-
0.21**
-
0.44** 1.00    
O4  
-
0.02** 0.00 0.00 0.02** 0.03** 
-
0.03** 0.04** 0.03** 0.00
-
0.02** 0.02** 0.14** 0.00
-
0.14**
-
0.28**
-
0.09** 1.00   
LD 0.00 0.26** 0.01**
-
0.01** 
-
0.09** 0.08** 0.05** -0.15 0.04**
-
0.10** 0.09** -0.20
-
0.06**
-
0.11** 0.12** 0.03** -0.12 1.00  
BR 0.11** 
-
0.13**
-
0.21** 0.01 0.02** 
-
0.01** 0.00
-
0.02** 0.00 0.00 0.01 
-
0.02** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 1.00 
